





“We Are Now of the View”∗:  
Backlash Activism, Cultural Cleansing, and the 
Kulturkampf to Resurrect the Old Deal 
Francisco Valdes∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
For the ninth time in as many years, LatCritters1 met in 2004 
 
 ∗ Chief Justice William Rehnquist, opining for the Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).  Variations on this phrasing recur in backlash 
jurisprudence, as expressed by the current appointees to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, to effectuate the rights reversals and legal roll-backs sketched here. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law and Director, Center for Hispanic and Caribbean Legal 
Studies, University of Miami. I thank the organizers, sponsors and participants of the 
LatCrit IX conference, upon which this symposium is based, and in particular the 
symposium contributors and law review editors whose work has created a lasting 
record of that stupendous conference.  This Afterword should be read in 
conjunction with its counterpart in the Villanova Law Review, which published the 
other half of this symposium.  Additionally this Afterword and its counterpart are in 
part based, and build, on previous efforts to analyze critically backlash kulturkampf 
as an overarching sociolegal phenomenon that necessarily frames the work of 
contemporary legal scholars.  In particular, see Culture, “Kulturkampf” and Beyond: The 
Antidiscrimination Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 271, 273-76 (Austin Sarat ed. 2004) and Afterword—
Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality and 
Responsibility In Social Justice Scholarship—Or, Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 
DENVER U. L. REV. 1409 (1998).  Finally, I dedicate this Afterword to Jerome Culp—
friend and warrior—who passed away in February 2004; this LatCrit conference was 
the first he missed, and we in turn missed him dearly.  As always, all errors are mine. 
 1 The term “LatCrit” was coined at a 1995 colloquium, held in Puerto Rico, on 
the relationship of critical race theory to “Latina/o” communities.  From that 
colloquium, the annual conferences then flowed.  See Francisco Valdes, Foreword - 
Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and Latina/o Self-Empowerment, 2 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997) (introducing the papers and proceedings of the first 
LatCrit conference).  On the emergence of a “LatCrit” subject position, see Berta 
Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused Constructs 
and Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 199, 200-05 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson & 
George A. Martinez, Crossover Dreams: The Roots of LatCrit Theory in Chicana/o Studies, 
Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143 (1999); Cf. Margaret E. Montoya, 
LatCrit Theory: Mapping Its Intellectual and Political Foundations and Future Self-Critical 
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during the Cinco de Mayo weekend not only to help recall the unjust 
events of that day a century and a half ago, but also to center and 
challenge its continuing legacies in law and society.2  These legacies 
live on in many forms and many ways, of course,3 and this year, the 
 
Directions, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1999).  See also Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco 
Valdes, Afterword - Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A 
Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. 
REV. 503, 568-71 (1998) (discussing the choice of “LatCrit” as partly a political 
decision to identify as much as possible with people of color, indigenous people, and 
other traditionally subordinated groups in the construction of this new discourse and 
praxis). 
Despite our common identification as LatCrits, this jurisprudential community, 
like “Latinas/os” and other social groups, is formed from a collection of “different” 
individuals.  See Sylvia A. Marotta & Jorge G. Garcia, Latinos in the United States in 
2000, 25 HISP. J. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 13 (2003) (presenting a contemporary portrait); 
Luis Angel Toro, “A People Distinct from Others”: Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law 
and the Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 1219 
(1995) (critiquing the ramifications of the current labeling system in the United 
States, which “lumps together all people who can connect themselves to some 
“Spanish origin or culture” together as “Hispanics”); Oscar Gonzalez, et al., History 
and Public Policy: Title VII and the Use of the Hispanic Classification, 5 LA RAZA L. J. 1 
(1992) (discussing federal adoption of the “Hispanic” label and critiquing the 
conglomeration of the Spanish-Hispanic-Latina/o labels into a single identity 
category). 
 2 See Symposium, Understanding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on Its 150th 
Anniversary, 5 S.W.J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1998) (reviewing the treaty by which the 
United States annexed Mexican lands and persons, and the treaty’s violation since 
then). 
 3 During the past nine years, LatCrit scholars have produced nearly twenty law 
review symposia in which we explore the manifold ways in which these colonial and 
neocolonial legacies continue to deform law and society.  The LatCrit symposia, 
including those not based on subsequent conferences or colloquia, include 
Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal 
Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997) (LatCrit I); Colloquium, International 
Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177 (1997) 
(publishing the proceedings of the first LatCrit colloquium focused on international 
law); Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latina/o Communities Through 
LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998) (LatCrit II); Symposium, 
Comparative Latinas/os: Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
575 (1999) (LatCrit III); Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit 
Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 751 (2000) (LatCrit IV); 
Colloquium, Spain, The Americas and Latino/as: International and Comparative Law in 
Triangular Perspective, 9 U. MIAMI INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2000-01) (publishing the 
proceedings of the first and second colloquia held in Malaga, Spain on LatCrit 
theory and international and comparative law); Symposium, Class in LatCrit: Theory 
and Praxis in a World of Economic Inequality, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 467 (2001) (LatCrit 
V); Symposium, Latinas/os and the Americas: Centering North-South Frameworks in LatCrit 
Theory, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2003), 54 RUTGERS L. REV.  803 (LatCrit VI); Symposium, 
Coalitional Theory and Praxis: Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community, 13 LA RAZA 
L.J. 113  (2002), 81 U. OR. L. REV. 595 (2003) (LatCrit VII); Symposium, City and 
Citizen: Operations of Power, Strategies of Resistance, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2004) (LatCrit 
VIII).  In addition to these conference-based publications, two joint LatCrit symposia 
also have been published during this time.  See Joint Symposium, LatCrit Theory: 
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LatCrit IX conference theme beckoned our critical collective 
attention toward “Countering Kulturkampf Politics Through Critque and 
Justice Pedagogy.”4  With this year’s call and focus, the LatCrit IX 
conference invited all OutCrit scholars and friends to train attention 
on the retrogressively synergistic consequences of kulturkampf on law 
and on society.5 In other words, to critically consider the 
consequences of reaction and retrenchment to our communities, 
aspirations, profession and, even, to our lives. 
In response, the contributors to this symposium6 have covered a 
wide range of issues regarding both the culture wars and the value of 
social justice pedagogies as an act of resistance to their ideological 
and political pressures.7 As a set, the symposium authors have 
 
Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998); Joint 
Symposium, Culture, Language, Sexuality and Law: LatCrit Theory and the Construction of 
the Nation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 787 (2000), and 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 203 (2000). 
 4 To view the LatCrit IX Call for Papers, please visit the LatCrit website 
http://www.latcrit.org. 
 5 OutCrit positionality is framed around the need to confront in collective and 
coordinated ways the mutually-reinforcing tenets and effects of two sociological 
macro-structures that currently operate both domestically and internationally: 
Euroheteropatriarchy and neoliberal globalization.  Therefore, among them are the 
legal scholars who in recent times have pioneered the various strands of outsider 
critical jurisprudence—OutCrits.  For further discussion of this designation, see 
Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Legal Theory and OutCrit Perspectivity: 
Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 831 (2000) 
(discussing the relationship between Euroheteropatriarchy and OutCrit theory and 
praxis).  The term “outsider jurisprudence” was first used by Professor Mari J. 
Matsuda.  See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989).  LatCrit theory is one strand in outsider 
jurisprudence, along with critical race theory, critical race feminism, Asian American 
scholarship, and Queer legal theory.  See generally Francisco Valdes, Afterword - 
Theorizing “OutCrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential 
Experience—RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999) 
(drawing lessons for LatCrit from the experiences of other outsider efforts, 
principally those of RaceCrits and QueerCrits). 
 6 The LatCrit IX symposium is a joint publication of this law review and the 
Villanova Law Review.  Each journal is publishing different “clusters” of essays 
defined thematically based on the proceedings of the LatCrit IX conference.  To 
view past symposia, visit the LatCrit website at http://www.latcrit.org. 
 7 These contributions include the uses of various familiar identity axes, such as 
race, gender, sexuality and class, to define and wage backlash kulturkampf.  See, e.g.,  
Carla D. Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf: The Role of Race Ideology in Constructing Native 
American Identity, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1241 (2005); Martha T. McCluskey, How 
Equality Became Elitist: The Cultural Politics of Economics from the Court to the “Nanny 
Wars,” 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1291 (2005).  Looking to the outgroup communities 
from which we hail and for whom we labor, the symposium contributions also 
examine cultural warfare, as well as oppositional practices, in various local settings.  
See, e.g., Anita Revilla, Raza  Womyn Mujerstoria, 50 VILL. L. REV. 799 (2005); Victor 
Romero, Rethinking Minority Coalition Building: Valuing Self-Sacrifice, Stewardship and 
Anti-Subordination, 50 VILL. L. REV. 823 (2005); Antonia Darder, Schooling and the 
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brought to us this new cross-disciplinary resource of substantive and 
pedagogical knowledge to help comprehend and combat the ways in 
which this neocolonial cultural warfare seeks to degrade our 
identities, communities, principles and, even, our work. 
This Afterword8 now closes this year’s conference-based LatCrit 
symposium with a similar focus on the sociolegal phenomenon 
centered in this year’s theme: the causes and consequences of the 
backlash kulturkampf.  This macro-phenomenon, which has come to 
dominate law and policy during the past two or so decades, has 
framed and informed the emergence and evolution of LatCrit theory 
during the past nine years, as well as that of critical outsider 
jurisprudence—or OutCrit—theories and efforts more generally.  
This macro-phenomenon also has framed and informed the 
emergence and evolution of backlash jurisprudence.  Both of these 
broad jurisprudential developments—the emergence of OutCrit and 
backlash versions of post-liberal jurisprudence—employ the liberal 
legacies of latter part of the twentieth century; both use the liberal 
legacy of formal equality as the point of departure: backlashers insist 
the legacy must be rolled back while OutCrits demand it be made 
more socially relevant.9 But these twin jurisprudential developments 
have not met with the same reception: the past two decades or so 
have witnessed backlash scholars systematically plucked from the 
legal academy (and other arenas) by backlash politicians to enact 
their opinions into Law through the judicial power of the federal 
government, 10 while outsider scholars continue to elaborate a post-
 
Empire of Capital: Unleashing the Contradictions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 847 (2005).  Looking 
beyond the United States, these accounts additionally include national as well as 
international and transnational analyses of cultural warfare in various sociolegal 
frameworks.  See, e.g., Angel Oquendo essay; Maria Clara Dias essay; Martin Saavedra 
essay; Gil Gott essay; Berta Hernandez essay.  And, finally, looking into our own 
profession—the professorate—these accounts similarly delve into the academic 
culture wars, and their significance to our work.  See, e.g., Mary Romero essay; Imani 
Perry essay; Alicia Alvarez essay; Sylvia Lazos essay; Fran Ansley & Cathy Cochran 
essay; Natasha Martin essay; Nelson Soto essay. 
 8 The companion to this Afterword, which appears in the portion of the LatCrit 
IX symposium being published by the Villanova Law Review, should be read in 
tandem with the analysis outlined below.  See supra note 6; see also Francisco Valdes, 
Afterword—Culture by Law: Backlash as Jurisprudence, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1135 (2005) 
[hereinafter Culture by Law].  In addition, and as noted below, this summary sketch 
builds on earlier works that collectively aim to make sense of the culture wars and 
their jurisprudential dimensions. 
 9 Francisco Valdes, Culture, “Kulturkampf” and Beyond: The Antidiscrimination 
Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND 
SOCIETY 271, 273-76 (Austin Sarat ed. 2004) (discussing the sociolegal legacies of 
Twentieth Century liberalisms) [hereinafter, Antidiscrimination]. 
 10 Notable exemplars are Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork, plucked from the law 
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subordination social vision (chiefly) from within the legal academy.11 
In pursuit of this basic objective and agenda, as elaborated 
below, backlashers presently in control of the federal courts use the 
very “judicial review” power that, as a jurisprudential camp, they most 
denounce—and in precisely the selectively “activist” ways that they 
denounce most loudly—to upset the legislative choices made through 
the “democratic” process.12  At the same time, outsider scholars have 
continued to experiment with traditional and nontraditional 
methods of scholarship to elucidate a socially just society under the 
antisubordination principle,13 thereby providing a fundamentally 
different policy alternative to backlash and retrenchment—an 
alternative that will remain available to the nation when the furies of 
this kulturkampf have spent themselves, and when the nation may 
once again resume its fitful march away from the identity-based 
 
faculties of the University of Chicago and Yale University, respectively, to become 
judicial appointees.  The former remains perched on the Supreme Court while the 
latter was appointed to the key Court of Appeals in the nation’s capital, where he 
enacted his opinions into law until his attempted appointment to the Supreme Court 
under President Reagan was defeated.   Bork’s attempted appointment and defeat 
were undertaken, and have been understood, as a key skirmish of the culture wars.  
See generally NORMAN VIERA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE 
BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS (1998). 
 11 For a collection of examples, see CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY 379 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds. 
2002). 
 12 For an illustrative sketch of some examples see generally infra Part II; see also infra 
notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
 13 The antisubordination principle is generally associated with critical outsider 
jurisprudence, although its initial articulation originates with Owen Fiss.  See Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS  107 (1976).  In 
both its original articulation and its OutCrit elaboration, the antisubordination 
principle is conceived as a jurisprudential honing of the antidiscrimination principle 
in order to “get at” the social problems associated with domination and subjugation.  
See Paul Brest, Foreword—In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1976) (articulating the principle and reviewing the Supreme Court’s elaboration 
and application of it).  The antidiscrimination principle, as interpreted in the form 
of formal equality, was made “blind” to the social and conceptual asymmetries 
between domination and subjugation, and was likewise made to regard all kinds of 
“discrimination” as equal, and equally suspect.  This construction of 
antidiscrimination as remedial law and policy thus failed to distinguish between 
remedial and invidious forms of “discrimination,” which in turn enabled notions of 
“reverse discrimination” that were used effectively to halt race-conscious remedial 
state actions tailored to similarly race-conscious acts of invidious discrimination.  See 
infra Part II.  Under the antidiscrimination principle as thus applied, remedies to 
discrimination were transmuted into discrimination; the remedy became the 
problem because the problem was defined as “discrimination” and the cure 
“antidiscimination” whereas the actual problem was and is subordination, and the 
cure thus must be tailored to antisubordination.  See generally Jerome M. Culp, Jr., et 
al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435 (2003) (discussing antidiscrimination and 
antisubordination). 
  
1412 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1407 
structural injustices that punctuated its founding and have bedeviled 
it since.  For the moment, however, social retrenchment through 
backlash jurisprudence, especially as elaborated by the five justices 
presently in control of the federal judicial power,14 is a key part of 
these culture wars and their stated aims: the “take back” of civil rights 
and social multiculturalism by mandate of formal Law. 
Thus, as recent sociolegal experience teaches—and as the 
LatCrit IX conference theme suggests—the recent history of social 
and legal backlash spanning the past several decades sketched below, 
during which claims of judicial activism have surfaced persistently, 
provides a rich backdrop to a national assessment of law, democracy, 
equality and justice in the United States.15 The culture wars that have 
framed our jurisprudential endeavors and experiments provide a 
potentially rich source of insight to understand how and why our 
efforts (as well as those of the backlashers) have succeeded (or not), 
and to assess what may or should come next.  As the conference 
theme notes, as the symposium contributors illustrate, and as this 
Afterword seeks to emphasize, the intersection of cultural warfare, 
critical scholarship and social justice education constitutes a timely—
and perhaps increasingly so—site of investigation and action for any 
critical scholar of any stripe concerned with the use of law and policy 
to re/engineer social and material realities.16 
 
 14 Backlash jurisprudence, as the summary of some key highlights in Part II 
shows, reaches both into substantive and procedural fields of law to accomplish social 
retrenchment across wide bands of constitutional law, oftentimes in the name of 
tradition, democracy and federalism.  The jurisprudential hard core of the “backlash 
bloc” leading this campaign of redirection from the Supreme Court consists of 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, with the usually reliable complicity of William 
Rehnquist in firm control of the institutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief 
Justice.  This bloc is completed by its two vacillating members, Sandra Day O’Connor 
and Anthony Kennedy, whose support is crucial to the operation of the bloc—and 
because their support vacillates, the bloc is unable to operate with the success and 
efficiency that the appointing executives had hoped to accomplish with each of these 
appointments.  Nonetheless, each and every member of this bloc was appointed to 
power expressly as part of the backlashers’ roll-back agenda.  When vacillating 
members of the bloc deviate from the script, they are excoriated by the other 
members for doing so.  See, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting).  As their fifty-some 5-4 backlash opinions in the last decade of 
the twentieth century aptly illustrate, this quintet operates as a bloc often enough to 
single-handedly enact a constitutional “counter-revolution” congruent with the social 
and ideological agenda of the backlash politicians who installed them into power.  
For an illustrative sketch, see infra Part II. 
 15 Indeed, in some ways the culture wars are a contestation precisely over the 
social an legal conceptions of these big-picture concepts.  See generally infra note 17 
and sources cited therein. 
 16 Both outsider and backlash jurisprudence underscore the interactivity of Law 
and Society.  Outsider jurisprudence focuses on social transformation through legal 
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Part I opens the Afterword with an overview of the culture wars’ 
origins, as they built momentum in the second half of the last century 
in reaction to the social effects of New Deal and Civil Rights 
lawmaking legacies, and then outlines the three broad lines or 
prongs of attack through which the neocolonial social ideologies and 
identity-inflected cultural imperatives of this reactionary roll-back 
campaign have been largely pursued.  Part II then provides a capsule 
critical sketch of some key rulings in recent culture war cases 
spanning various doctrinal categories, which jointly illustrate some of 
the substantive legal domains and key or recurrent interpretative 
techniques most salient in backlash jurisprudence. Part III concludes 
the Afterword and symposium with brief notes on the individual 
interventions, institutional reforms and collective insurrections that 
LatCrit and other OutCrit scholars do and should employ to combat 
this ongoing surge of reaction and retrenchment, both in the short 
and longer term, through critical scholarship, social justice 
pedagogies and other forms of antisubordination praxis.  This 
Afterword, in sum, aims to center the patterns and agendas of 
backlash kulturkampf, both in law and in society, in order to raise 
awareness and resistance of the interconnections that make this 
phenomenon extraordinary.17 
 
reformation while backlash jurisprudence engineers social retrenchment through 
legal retrenchment.  The two are socially conscious, outcome-conscious.  Both are 
concerned about the uses of law to construct culture, and the uses of culture to 
promulgate Law.  See Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 5.   
 17 In the form of this Afterword, this mapping of origins, law and resistance is but 
a rough sketch—a sketch of illustrative highlights regarding the substance and 
method of backlash jurisprudence, and of its consequences, as part and parcel of the 
backlash kulturkampf sweeping through the United States today.  This sketch builds 
on earlier efforts to articulate this phenomenon, and to underscore its relevance to 
the principles and projects that LatCrit and other OutCrit scholars do or should 
undertake.  This Afterword is part of a larger work-in-progress elucidating backlash 
jurisprudence as part and parcel of the culture wars, which in turn builds on previous 
efforts.  See Francisco Valdes, Culture, “Kulturkampf” and Beyond: The Antidiscrimination 
Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND 
SOCIETY 271 (Austin Sarat ed. 2004), (focusing broadly on three theoretical 
perspectives—backlash jurisprudence, liberal legalisms and critical outsider 
jurisprudence—to compare their approaches to equality law and policy); Francisco 
Valdes, Warts, Anomalies and All: Four Score of Liberty, Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1341 (2005) (focusing specifically on Lawrence v. Texas and generally on liberty-
privacy as a central doctrinal terrain of social and legal retrenchment) [hereinafter 
Four Score]; Francisco Valdes, Afterword—Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal 
Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality and Responsibility in Social Justice 
Scholarship—Or, Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENVER U. L. REV. 1409 (1998) 
(focusing on the implications of cultural warfare for sexual orientation scholarship 
specifically, and for all OutCrit scholars generally) [hereinafter Beyond Sexual 
Orientation].  These works, in turn, inform and are informed by related concerns or 
issues that form part of my larger scholarly agenda.  See Francisco Valdes, Outsider 
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It bears note at the outset that this Afterward proceeds from a 
critical appreciation of the alternative accounts proferred elsewhere 
to help explain the jurisprudential maneuvers and outcomes of the 
culture war rulings issued by backlash judges.18 Those accounts and 
the one presented below diverge in sometimes marked ways because 
they emphasize the familiar aspects of legal indeterminacy and 
judicial discretion, whereas the account unfolded here aligns more 
closely with the recent research into the behavior of individuals 
appointed to be judges—research that examines whether those 
behaviors produce patterns of consistency between their personal 
ideological preferences, as manifested in pre-appointment statements 
or actions, and their post-appointment adjudicatory acts.  This 
research, which has given rise to the “attitudinal model” for analyzing 
and gauging the influence of personal predilection in formally 
judicial acts, has documented a clear and stunning consistency in the 
convergence of political ideology and adjudicatory outcome—a 
convergence that effectively portrays a near-complete collapse of the 
idealized distinction between law or principle and politics or 
ideology.19  This attitudinal model challenges the fictions maintained 
 
Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical 
Legal Education 10 ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003) [hereinafter Critical Legal Education]; 
Francisco Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American 
Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377 (2002); Francisco Valdes, Insisting on Critical 
Theory in Legal Education: Making Do While Making Waves, 12 LA RAZA L. J. 137 (2001); 
Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity and Hispanismo in Triangular Perspective: The “Essential 
Latina/o” and LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305 (2000);  Francisco Valdes, Outsider 
Scholars, Legal Theory and OutCrit Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential 
Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 101 (2000);  Francisco Valdes, Afterword—Theorizing 
"OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience—
RaceCrits, QueerCrits, LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999); Francisco Valdes, 
Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory 
and Politics of "Sexual Orientation", 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1193 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex 
and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995).  In time, this work should produce a book, 
FRANCISCO VALDES, JUDGING THE PLEASURE OF JUDGING: DEMOCRACY, LAW AND SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING. 
 18 For a prominent and thoughtful recent example written in the context of 
liberty-privacy, see Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare 
not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-
Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L.REV. 293 
(1992). 
 19 For a more substantive description of this “attitudinal model” for the analysis 
of judicial opinions, see generally Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9, at 275, and 
sources cited therein.  The basic conclusions of this field were more recently 
corroborated by a study of the cases argued during the 2002 Supreme Court Term.  
Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The 
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004). 
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under the “legal model” of analyzing the behavior of judicial 
appointees, and thereby corroborates the conclusions drawn from 
the illustrative survey of backlash rulings undertaken here.20 
But this Afterword does not proceed from, nor try to assert, a 
simple complaint of politicized judicial appointees acting in 
politically calculated ways; this complaint, though serious enough to 
occupy the nation since the founding, also has a venerable history 
that stretches back to 1800 and the first factional transfer of federal 
political power after the Constitution’s adoption, when the Adams 
administration and the Federalist Party handed over the reins of the 
executive and legislative branches to Jefferson and his supporters but 
tried, before the inauguration of their victorious opponents, to wield 
their lame duck powers to seize long-term control of the judicial 
branch. That original “court packing scheme” produced a series of 
political machinations in which Congress and the President used 
their powers to rescind Federalist legislation creating new judicial 
 
 20 In like vein, this Afterword also proceeds from a wry recognition of the dangers 
that may accompany a too-frank exposé of the human-civil rights subversion 
launched and orchestrated from the Supreme Court bench by kulturkampf 
appointees installed into those positions during the past decade or two precisely 
(and explicitly) for this reactive purpose. See generally Owen Fiss, Another Equality, 
ISSUES L. SCHOLARSHIP, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art20.  In this essay, Fiss 
critiques the use of narrative by critical race and other OutCrit theorists “as a 
substitute for the reasoned argument traditionally associated with the law.  
Narrativity as OutCrit method, Fiss believes, “is a way of subverting the authority of 
the Court [but] . . . we should criticize the Court for what it says, not subvert its 
authority in a deliberate or flagrant way or mock its commitment to public reasons by 
responding to its decisions with stories.  The Third Reconstruction will need the 
Court,” he concludes.  Id. at 24.  In this Afterword, narrativity is not the focus; rather 
the focus is on a substantive critique of the strategic maneuvers that pervade “what 
the Court says” and, more specifically, what the backlash bloc says in the name of the 
Court.  In my view, the content of the opinions issued by this bloc in the name of the 
Court mock that institution’s historic aspiration or “commitment to public reason” in 
increasingly flagrant ways that have prompted increasingly widespread recognition 
that the ideal of the Rule of Law in the United States has thereby been put into 
serious question.  See, e.g., infra note 25 and sources cited therein. 
In my view, the benefits of the exposé—critical awareness, consciousness-raising 
and active resistance—outweigh the fear of the dangers—erosion of the federal 
judiciary’s institutional legitimacy in the longer term; indeed, in my view, the feared 
dangers are due more to the increasingly blatant (and thus difficult to ignore or 
obscure) gyrations of backlash judges to reach their preferred results than to the 
public’s observation of them.  Nonetheless, in recognition of the feared nihilism—
and because to do so is descriptively and conceptually accurate as well—this 
Afterword attempts throughout the analysis presented below to accentuate the 
distinction between the federal judiciary as an institution and the individuals who 
currently wield its awesome powers to wage backlash kulturkampf in the guise of 
constitutional adjudication and interpretation—especially the literal handful of 
individuals who form the backlash bloc on the current Supreme Court.  See supra 
note 14. 
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officers and refused to deliver commissions that the Federalists had 
been unable to finalize prior to the expiration of their terms in 
power.21  Since then, the power wielded by federal judicial appointees 
has been controversial, perhaps most so during the period of 
mounting activism leading up to the mid-1930s, when a bare majority 
of the Supreme Court exercised the judicial review power time and 
again to trump New Deal lawmaking. With this conspicuous history as 
background, it would be too simple to complain at this late stage of 
political judicial appointees and politicized judicial opinions.  
Indeed, the point that all judges—“liberal” as well as backlash—
perform their official duties under the influence of political ideology 
is amply demonstrated by the findings of attitudinal research, and is 
herewith conceded.22 
Thus, the critique or complaint leveled here goes beyond that 
basic complaint; the critique presented below measures backlash 
jurisprudence first and foremost against the rhetoric and principles 
that its adherents noisily espouse, and purport to apply in critical 
judgment of others, to justify the righteousness of their zealous 
endeavors to undo the law and policy legacies they so strongly 
despise. This critique is based not on the observation that federal 
judges of all ideological stripes can and do “make law” influenced by 
their cultural and political sense of the world, but on the observation 
that backlash jurisprudence fails, spectacularly, to approximate a 
principled body of law on its own terms—and, more importantly, to the 
potentially enduring detriment not only of the vulnerable social 
groups it targets directly but also of the nation as a whole in its 
unfinished repudiation of the various identity-rooted viruses of 
domination and oppression embedded in the original constitutional 
compromises regarding race, gender, property and other still-
entrenched markers of social stratification.23  This critique is not a 
 
 21 Those machinations, of course, produced the famous case of Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 107 (1803), in which the Federalist judges, led by the newly-
appointed Chief Justice John Marshall, declared for themselves the power to review 
the constitutionality of federal legislative and executive acts—and invalidated the 
Federalist legislation creating the commissions in controversy.  For background, see 
JAMES E. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002) (elaborating a comprehensive 
analysis of the life-long animosities and conflicts between these two members of the 
founding generation, and how their relationship represented a microcosm of the 
political struggles that framed the founding). 
 22 See supra note 19 and sources cited therein. 
 23 These viruses are encapsulated in various formative exclusions, which limited 
individuals’ opportunity to participate or compete in the new nation’s political and 
economic development, to white propertied men, and in particular in the 
constitutional compromise over race-based slavery—a compromise that enshrined 
  
2005 KULTURKAMPF TO RESURRECT THE OLD DEAL 1417 
generalized lament over the impossibility of neutral principles or 
judicial legitimacy writ large but rather a more specific charge of 
intellectual dishonesty to occlude power abuses in the launching and 
waging of a ferocious “counter-revolution” in the name of the 
nation’s Constitution and from the nation’s highest court of law,24 
abuses that, from various perspectives, have subverted not only the 
perception and reality of Rule of Law within the United States in 
substantive terms but that also have undermined the collective 
capacity of a diverse nation to sustain trust and confidence in its 
judicial institutions.25 
I. BACKLASH, JURISPRUDENCE AND KULTURKAMPF: BACKGROUND AND 
CONTEXT 
While the term “kulturkampf” may (and does) refer to various 
periods in different social and political settings,26 in the United States 
at the turn of the millennium the term had come to signify the 
national coordination of political efforts to retrench civil rights and 
New Deal legacies in both social and legal terms.27  These 
 
federal protection of human chattel as the supreme law of the land in at least two 
textual ways: (1) the constitution forbids the federal government from freeing 
enslaved humans or interfering with their status as property until 1808, thus 
permitting social, political and economic entrenchment during this period, and it 
requires all free states to extradite escaped slaves back to their “masters” in the slave 
states.  See generally Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States 
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987) (reflecting on the original identity-based 
constitutional exclusions and their enduring consequences). 
 24 Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in 
Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 677 (1991) (elaborating a relatively 
early analysis of the phenomena now known as backlash kulturkampf and 
jurisprudence); see also Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) 
(noting that the nation was and is “in the midst of a counter-revolution; not because 
we are at the verge of a new discovery, but because the discovery of an earlier era is 
now in jeopardy”). 
 25 This self-inflicted damage is exemplified by the public acknowledgement of the 
current Court’s most senior Republican appointee, John Paul Stevens, who frankly 
conceded in the aftermath of the 5-4 halt to vote-counting in 2000 that the bloc’s 
action in Bush v. Gore had seriously shaken “the nation’s confidence in the judge as 
an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”  531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000).  To repeat, this 
dangerous loss of trust results from the judges’ hypocrisy, and not from a frank 
acknowledgement or critical expose of it. 
 26 Culture wars and kulturkampf are associated with German politics, both 
during the Bismarckian struggle to assert secular state authority over Catholic dogma 
in the form of public policy and during the efforts of the Nazi Party to reform 
German culture in line with their racist ideology.  See generally RICHARD J. EVANS, THE 
COMING OF THE THIRD REICH 118-53 (2003) (focusing on the culture wars waged in 
Germany as part of the Nazi rise to power).  
 27 See Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17, at 1427, n. 70 (defining 
the term and describing the phenomenon). 
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orchestrated efforts span multiple categories of identity and policy 
but, in addition to race and ethnicity, they have focused inordinately 
on sex, gender and sexuality (and, concomitantly, on religion and 
“morality”).28  Thus, it is no coincidence that, twice now, and both 
times in sexual regulation cases, the high Court’s chief wit, Antonin 
Scalia, has invoked the notion of “kulturkampf” to deride the Court’s 
decisions protecting a vulnerable group from majoritarian 
subordination.  Dissenting from Romer v. Evans,29 and again from 
Lawrence v. Texas,30 he ridicules the majority’s analysis and holding as 
mere participation in the “culture wars” sweeping the United States 
during the last quarter or so of the Twentieth Century.  In doing so, 
Scalia reminds us all of the times in which we live—the context in 
which these cases have been litigated and adjudicated, and the 
zeitgeist under which LatCrit and other genres of critical outsider 
jurisprudence came to be. 
As with backlash jurisprudence and outsider jurisprudence, the 
stirrings of today’s “culture wars” go back to the 1970s and 1980s, to 
the times when the liberal antidiscrimination initiatives of earlier 
decades were increasingly contested from all sides.31  But the moment 
of its official declaration occurred in 1992, from the podium of the 
Republican National Convention, when presidential contender 
Patrick Buchanan declared “cultural war” for the “soul of America.”32 
Since then, the invocation of “cultural war” to explain and motivate 
political action has take place repeatedly.33  By the turn of the 
 
 28 Illustrating this point, news accounts following the 2004 electoral cycle 
reported that “abortion has become a prime target” of “Democratic strategists and 
lawmakers quietly” as they “discuss how to straddle the nation’s Red-Blue divide” and 
that they have concluded that the “issue and the message need to be completely 
rethought” because “along with gay marriage, abortion is at the epicenter of the 
culture wars, another example used by Republicans to highlight the Democrats’ 
supposed moral relativism.”  Debra Rosenberg, Anxiety Over Abortion: Pro-Choice 
Democrats Eye a More Restrictive Approach to Abortion as One Way to Gain Ground at the 
Polls, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 20, 2004, at 38 (also reporting that the conclusions of this 
reassessment were espoused and endorsed by that year’s party standard-bearer, John 
Kerry).  Whether or not this particular conclusion is sound, it serves to illustrate how 
sex and sexuality, along with race, nationality and ethnicity, have been positioned at 
the “epicenter” of backlash kulfturkampf. 
 29 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 30 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 31 See Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9 at 276-82 (comparing and 
contrasting these two jurisprudential camps and their positions vis a vis the culture 
wars). 
 32 See infra note 68. 
 33 The term’s usage in law and society thus marks and reflect the mounting 
pursuit and awareness of the backlash agenda that animates this cultural warfare: in 
1980, the term was used in public newspapers, magazines and related media 4 times; 
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century, in the year 2000, the term had been used 1,902 times in the 
public media, including in the tense context of resolving the 
November 2000 presidential election.34  This kulturkampf of backlash 
is not, however, a simple case of rough-and-tumble politics as usual, 
wherein self-interested “factions” are expected to jockey for social 
and economic goods.  Rather, this multi-year phenomenon is a 
concerted and multi-pronged campaign for the “soul” of the nation 
in which the named and targeted “enemy” consistently has been one 
or more of the nation’s historically marginalized and now-still-
vulnerable social groups: racial and ethnic minorities, women of the 
“feminist” type, poor persons of all colors, consumers, 
environmentalists, workers, Queer communities and sexual 
minorities, immigrants from the South and East, including the 
Middle East, and other Others.  In effect, this targeting amounts to a 
kind of “cultural cleansing” that, in the name of “history and 
tradition”, will leave the purified society looking and feeling like the 
1780s as much as politically and physically possible.35 
Plainly, this kulturkampf of retrenchment seriously and 
detrimentally affects many if not all outgroups.36  But, just as plainly, 
the culture wars find “different” groups positioned “differently” vis a 
vis the formal and actual retrenchment of rights through backlash.37   
 
in 1990, 76 times; and in 1992—the year of formal declaration—575 times.  See 
Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9, at 283. 
 34 For example, in defending the 2000 nomination of John Ashcroft—a 
prominent but recently defeated backlash politician from Missouri—to take over the 
federal Justice Department and become the nation’s chief federal law enforcement 
officer, a backlash-identified talk show host based in the nation’s capital declared, 
“This is culture war—two mutually exclusive world views continue to fight for 
preeminence in our culture.”  James Kuhnhenn & Ron Hutcheson, Ashcroft is Next 
Political Flash Point; Partisan Lines are Clearly Drawn, MIA. HERALD, Jan. 11, 2001 at 1A. 
 35 The re-segregation of higher public education provides a pointed example.  See 
generally infra notes 107-108 and sources cited therein. 
 36 As Bowers v. Hardwick indicates, for instance, backlash jurisprudence began 
taking hold just as sexual minorities—specifically lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and 
transsexuals—began to claim formal equality and antidiscrimination rights under 
existing laws or precedents.  See Valdes, Culture by Law, supra note 8.  In effect, then, 
the historical moment for the surge of backlash kulturkampf and retrenchment 
occurred at roughly the same time as sexual minorities began seeking vindication of 
antidiscrimination rights in federal courts within the broader context of “civil rights.”  
Thus, for racial/ethnic minorities, backlash kulturkampf endeavors to roll back 
affirmative action programs and for sexual minorities the aim is to preclude the 
attachment of formal equality altogether.  While immigrants, women, racial/ethnic 
minorities, native Americans, the disabled, the poor, sexual minorities all feel the 
sting of retrenchment, they feel it “differently.” 
 37 Consequently, the social, cultural, political and legal dynamics of backlash 
kulturkampf implicate the “sameness-difference” concerns and discourse associated 
with various strands of critical outsider jurisprudence.  See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, 
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MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); see 
also Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The 
Difference It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. OF GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving 
the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and 
Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L. J. 296.  The collective effort to mint concepts like 
antiessentialism, multiplicity, intersectionality, cosynthesis, wholism, 
interconnectivity, multidimesionality and the like also reflects a similar grappling 
with issues of sameness and difference in various genres of contemporary critical 
legal theory.  See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); 
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 
(1990); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
139.  Various RaceCrit and LatCrit scholars have continued to develop concepts and 
tools of critical legal theory to build on these foundational concepts, striving 
progressively to better capture the dynamics of “identity politics” in law and society.  
See, e.g., e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected 
Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441 (1998) (on wholism); 
Berta Hernandez-Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: 
Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1991) (on 
multidimensionality); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of 
Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 U. CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997) (on 
multidimensionality); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997) (on cosynthesis); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer 
Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 25 (1995) (on interconnectivity); see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, 
Foreword—Race, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 819, 834-35 (1995) (urging greater efforts along these lines to promote 
multifaceted projects of social transformation). 
This concern has prompted a rich and continuing exploration of coalitional 
theory and praxis as antisubordination method.  See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, The Struggle 
for Civil Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within 
Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759 (2003) (discussing the important role of coalitions 
in civil rights struggles); Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latinao Legal 
Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 101 (1997) (focusing on the challenges facing 
LatCrit theory regarding coalitional work); George A. Martinez, African-Americans, 
Latinos and the Construction of Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO 
L. REV. 213 (1998)  (urging Latinas/os, Blacks and other groups of color to coalesce 
around “race” and our collective, cumulative knowledge of white supremacy); Mari J. 
Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (urging antisubordination analyses to "ask the other 
question" as a means of theorizing across single-axis group boundaries); Ediberto 
Roman, Common Ground: Perspectives on Latina-Latino Diversities, 2 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 483, (1997) (elaborating commonalities upon which Latinas/os may build a 
sense of constructive collectivity and urging Latinas/os to focus on our similarities 
rather than our differences as a way of promoting intra-group justice and solidarity); 
Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome 
McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds. 2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Conflict and 
Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 495 (1997) 
(analyzing inter-group grievances and relations among groups of color). 
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These differentials mean that the aspects or techniques of cultural 
warfare have been tailored for and directed at “different” groups in 
group-specific ways—in ways that account for each group’s standing 
in relationship both to formal law and to social reality.38  But the 
overarching pattern of backlash jurisprudence as part and parcel of 
these culture wars has been the pursuit of a self-subscribed “anti-anti-
discrimination agenda” under the guise of principled adjudication.39  
 
 38 As sketched below, backlash activism has included the aggressive review of 
precedent to narrow their civil rights reach; the heightening of procedural rules to 
block civil rights claims on technical grounds; the strict interpretation of legislative 
initiatives on behalf of civil rights communities under both principal instruments for 
doing so—the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, 
finally, a proactive and unilateral reinterpretation of the Tenth and Eleventh 
amendments to expand “states rights” affirmatively under “fundamental postulates” 
based on the personal views and preferences mainly of five judges.  Under backlash 
jurisprudence, burdens of evidence and/or rules of procedure are invoked, and then 
deployed to shield discrimination from viable claims.  Similarly, precedent is 
critiqued, ignored and rejected—or manipulated through “creative” distinction—
while legislation is cabined.  See infra Part II; see also Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore 
Eisenberg and Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547 (2003) (focusing on 
judicial bias against plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases); Kevin M. 
Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights 
Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (same); William B. 
Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial 
Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TULANE L. REV. 1485 (1990) (focusing on 
retrenchment in that key term of the Supreme Court); Charles R. Lawrence, III, 
“Justice” or “Just Us”: Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983) 
(focusing on race and White Supremacy); Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, 
Constitutional Restraints and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 
(1989) (critiquing the interposition of jurisdictional and prudential barriers to 
deflect civil rights actions); Robert P. Smith, Explaining Judicial Lawgivers, 11 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 153 (1983) (surveying techniques of judicial manipulation of facts and 
doctrine); Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step 
Forward or a Step Back?, 49 MO. L. REV. 677 (1984) (critiquing the heightened rules of 
pleading that various federal judges had erected to rebuff civil rights claimants).  
These and similar practices have prompted various scholars to question the 
principled nature of their opinions. 
 39 Jeb Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002) 
(evaluating the current judges’ manipulation or disregard of precedent and canons 
of interpretation in pursuit of their anti-anti-discrimination political agenda).  Many 
scholars have drawn similar observations in recent years.  See, e.g., Keith Aoki, The 
Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996); 
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Fiss, supra note 13; Alan D. 
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:  A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Karst, supra note 24; 
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination:  A Critical Response to 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984); see also Valdes, 
Antidiscrimination, supra note 9, at 283-86 and sources cited therein. 
In broad historical perspective, then, the ultimate objective of backlash 
kulturkampf has been to shift the normative trajectory of sociolegal development 
  
1422 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1407 
As outlined below, a bare majority of the current appointees 
increasingly has inscribed backlash jurisprudence onto the 
constitutional heritage of the nation, oftentimes with sweeping 
pronouncements issued in their sharply-divided 5-4 opinions, 
scrambling existing jurisprudential patterns, over the spirited 
objections of the dissenters, to impose social regression regarding 
civil and human rights along the familiar neocolonial fault lines of 
power, property, opportunity and identity; indeed, backlash activism 
has reached such a “fever pitch” in recent years that the regular 
updating of a leading treatise on constitutional law has been 
suspended, for the first time since 1978, “because so many precedents 
that had once seemed settled now appear at risk of being overruled” 
single-handedly by this willful quintet .40 
 
away from antisubordination lawmaking, toward which it had been unfolding since 
the New Deal and Civil Rights eras during the mid-twentieth century, and back to 
“history and tradition” as a virtually insurmountable block to civil and human rights 
progress in general. In this broader historical context, the brief federal experiment 
with “affirmative action”—especially the momentary flirtation with “quotas”—during 
the 1970s and 1980s marked the limits of the Law’s progression from 
antidiscrimination to antisubordination.  See supra note 13 and sources cited therein.  
Therefore, various OutCrit scholars have explored the aspirations and limitations of 
affirmative action as one key (though fragile) remedy for past and present forms of 
invidious, structural supremacies based on race, sex and other identity axes, 
including the enduring effects of entrenched supremacies within the nation’s legal 
academy.  See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the 
Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001); Susan Sturm & 
Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 953 (1996); see also Marina Angel, The Glass Ceiling of Women in Legal Education: 
Contract Positions and the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (2000); Richard H. 
Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School 
Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988); Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors’ 
Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1989); Richard Delgado, 
Affirmative Action as Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991); Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race 
Theory’s Cutting Edge: Key Movements that Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 32 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal 
Culp, Jr. & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the 
Academy: Of Poets and Kings, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (1992); William C. Kidder, 
Situating Asian Pacific Americans in the Law School Affirmative Action Debate: Empirical 
Facts About Thernstrom’s Rhetorical Acts, 7 ASIAN L.J. 29 (2000); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 
429 (1986); Rachel F. Moran, Commentary:  The Implications of Being a Society of One, 20 
U.S.F. L. REV. 503 (1986); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What 
the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2000). See generally James E. Jones, Jr., 
Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (1988) (providing a first-hand 
insider’s account of the origins of federal affirmative action policies). 
 40 See Jeffrey Toobin, Breyer’s Big Idea, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 31, 2005, at 36 
(reporting the suspension and quoting the treatise editor); see also infra Part II 
(summarizing some of the culture war cases and backlash activist techniques).  For 
additional analyses of backlash kulturkampf in law and society, see generally Kevin R. 
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A. The Culture Wars in Law and Society: Overview, Origins and 
Imperatives 
The origins of the current culture wars within the United States 
may be proximately traced to the “silent majority” and (later) “moral 
majority” rhetoric made prominent by Richard Nixon in national 
electoral politics as the 1968 Republican candidate for the 
presidency,41 a tactic that built on and sought to exploit for rank 
political gain preceding fulminations over “liberal activist judges” 
who in those years were dismantling apartheid and other entrenched 
forms of structural stratification based on “traditional” supremacist 
identity politics in this country.42  The antidote for such judicial 
 
Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 
187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 650-58 
(1995) (analyzing the racial rhetoric and politics of Proposition 187); Nicolas 
Espiritu, (E)Racing Youth: The Racialized Construction of California’s Proposition 21 and 
the Development of Alternate Contestations, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2005) (focusing on 
cultural warfare against youth of color in California through the use of the 
proposition system in that state); Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and 
Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118 
(1995) (deconstruction the racialized political dynamics of that early Proposition); 
see generally Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of 
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995) 
(analyzing the identity politics and social consequences of recent legal “reforms”). 
 41 “The term ‘silent majority’ so delighted the president that after he wrote it in a 
November 1 draft [of a major televised speech] at 4:00 a.m., he called [White House 
Chief of Staff] Haldeman to announce, ‘the baby’s been born.’  The peroration was 
widely thought to have been a deliberate attempt to polarize by dividing the nation 
into tiny minorities of noisy protesters deliberately obstructing peace and a large 
majority of quiet patriots.”  CAROL GELDERMAN, ALL THE PRESIDENTS’ WORDS: THE 
BULLY PULPIT AND THE CREATION OF THE VIRTUAL PRESIDENCY 84 (1997); see also 
Douglas Anderson, Nixon, Agnew and the ‘Silent Majority’: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of 
Polarization 35 WEST. SPEECH 243 (1971) (elaborating a rhetorical study of Nixon’s 
politicking); see generally STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN 
1962-1972, 310-14 (1989) (providing a general political biography of that decade, 
including the rhetoric and politics of his Silent Majority Speech in 1969).  Nixon’s 
politics and rhetorics of course were also part of his long-running denunciation of 
the mass media, which he viewed as an abiding “enemy” of his political ambitions 
and agenda, a view carried forward by his culture war successors, including perhaps 
most notably, Ronald Reagan.  See, e.g., WALTER PORTER, ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA: THE 
NIXON YEARS (1976); JOSEPH C. SPEAR, PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS: THE NIXON LEGACY 
(1984).  This “assault” included a structural consolidation of the national media, 
prompted through regulatory actions of federal backlash appointees under Nixon, 
Reagan and similar politicians, which has led to a silencing of opposition to backlash 
politics.  See, e.g., infra note 78 and sources cited therein on media regulatory changes 
and their anti-democratic character. 
 42 This era of “liberal activist judges” is depicted as beginning in the 1960s under 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, and is portrayed as the complaint of backlashers, who 
“promise that their replacements will not be so free-wheeling.”  Sullivan, supra note 
18, at 293.  For historical accounts, see LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE 
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overreaching, politicians like Nixon argued, was the appointment of 
 
SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978 (1979).  For a remarkable 
insider’s account of the appointment to the Court of its current Chief Justice, and 
the ideological purposes behind his appointment in the context of the gathering 
culture wars, see JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2002); DAVID G. SAVAGE, 
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992). 
For now-classic expositions of this backlash portrayal, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE  POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) and RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT  BY  JUDICIARY (1977); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).  This campaign of course 
evokes historical and legitimate concerns over abuses of power, including judicial 
abuses.  For noted examples, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 
(1962), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME 
COURT (1964).  The gathering of the culture wars, as expressed in these early 
expositions of jurisprudential reaction, engendered a lively exchange over the 
legitimacy of the doctrinal and policy legacies under backlash attack.  Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Jan G. 
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:  Some Intersections Between Law 
and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and 
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Thomas C. Grey, Do We have a Written 
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 781 (1983). 
Given the nature of the backlashers’ rhetoric when set against this larger 
backdrop, their current and ongoing campaign to recapture and control the federal 
judiciary has received widespread scholarly attention, some critical and some 
descriptive.  E.g., DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 56-86 (2000); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR. THE TRANSOFRMATION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT’S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1991); 
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER (1991); HERMAN 
SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE 
CONSTITUTION (1988); Valdes, Antidiscriminaiton, supra note 9, at 287-91 (providing 
an extensive bibliography on the general topic). 
This backlash attack on precedent and legislation from the New Deal and Civil 
Rights eras, and the obsession with perceived or actual instances of judicial will that it 
has engendered, also has erupted onto the pages of the law reports.  This 
phenomenon is captured in the opinions issued in Dronenbrug v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), reh’ en banc denied 746 F.2d 1579 (1984).  The appellate panel in 
that case was dominated by two of the most virulent backlash judges in the federal 
judiciary, if not the whole country—Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork—and the 
panel’s opinion was composed by the latter.  The dissenting opinion to the denial of 
rehearing en banc filed by Circuit Judges Robinson, Wald, Mikva and Edwards, and 
the responding “statements” filed by Judges Ginsburg, Bork, Scalia and Starr, make 
for a fascinating mini-seminar in the role of courts in the United States as a formally 
“democratic” nation committed to the Rule of Law with much current relevance: two 
of those judges currently sit on the Supreme Court—Scalia and Ginsburg.  The panel 
opinion penned by Bork is a textbook example of backlash activism specifically in the 
area of liberty-privacy and sexual orientation; it displays the effort to roll back 
precedent, in part by straining “to confine those decisions to their facts.”  746 F.2d at 
1580 (Robinson, III, C.J., Wald, J., Mikva J., and Edwards, J. dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc.) 
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“strict constructionist” judges who would simply “follow the law” 
rather than “legislate from the bench.”43  The social consequences of 
 
 43 See RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 33-45 
(1980) (on the politics of the Nixon nominations to the Supreme Court); LAURENCE 
TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 41-49 (1985) (on the “myth of the strict 
constructionist”).  The same rhetoric and campaign continues to this day, as the daily 
news reports demonstrate.  E.g., Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2002, at A1; Robert A. Carp, Keneth L. Manning & 
Ronald Stidham, The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush’s Judicial Appointees: 
Far-Right, Conservative or Moderate? 88 JUDICATURE 20 (2004) (reporting that overall 
voting patterns indicate that the most recent appointees “are among the most 
conservative on record”). 
This “strict construction” sloganeering, oftentimes accompanied by assertions of 
“states’ rights,” employs the rhetorical strategies developed over history by political 
factions that feared the federal government’s powers could interfere with local power 
arrangements, beginning with the antifederalists of the eighteenth century and 
continued by the Jeffersonians during the period of Alexander Hamilton’s influence 
in the George Washinton administrations, which they bitterly opposed.  Ironically, 
key founders like Jefferson and Madison became opposed to the federal government 
that they had helped to establish, but only until they themselves were elected 
President of that government, at which they time they no longer cared to be bound 
by a “strict construction” of the powers they then wielded.  This strategic pose and 
rhetoric later were thematized in the nineteenth century by southern interests intent 
on preserving and expanding slave territories in the United States.  This same line 
was continued during the post-Civil War Jim Crow era and into the twentieth century, 
by the Ku Klux Klan and “segregationists” who vowed to maintain the North 
American system of de jure apartheid that, in legal terms, represented their notion 
of federal “strict construction” and expansive “states rights.”  This historical 
continuity eventually produced the famous clashes between federal troops and state 
militias during the integration of southern schools following Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme 
Court found it necessary to re-assert the power of judicial review claimed and 
exercised by the judges since Madison v. Marbury in 1802 in the effort to curb these 
twin assertions as a matter of law. 
Notably, Marbury’s renowned author, John Marshall, had forcefully rejected the 
strict construction argument during those formative years, as exemplified by 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  In McCulloch, the Supreme 
Court upheld federal legislation chartering a federal bank even though the text of 
the Constitution does not expressly enumerate the power to charter corporations 
among those vested in the federal legislature.  In a unanimous opinion authored by 
John Marshall, the Court juxtaposed two basic approaches to constitutional 
interpretation: the “just” or “sound” approach versus the “narrow” or “strict” 
approach.  Opting for the former, those judges reasoned that the former would 
entail a “baneful influence” on the nation due to the “absolute impracticality of 
maintaining it without rendering the government incompetent to its great objects.”  
Id. at 417-18.   This rendering has been precisely the goal of every advocate who 
interposed these arguments in North American constitutional history, and it likewise 
is the goal of cultural warfare and backlash activism: disabling the government from 
its capacity to reform entrenched social hierarchies established in part by force of law 
in eras of formal subordination based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation 
and other forms of social stratification, and that now are structurally entrenched 
culturally and materially in law and society. Historically dominant groups now waging 
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this political argument, of course, were clear: existing structures of 
subordination emplaced de jure through nominal democracy 
oftentimes in the form of state law and federal policy during prior 
eras of formal inequality, such as structures or norms that favor men 
over women or whites over nonwhites based largely on sex, race and 
ethnicity, would be freed of any politically independent scrutiny, and 
remain a seemingly “natural” or “traditional”—and therefore 
supposedly unassailable—fixture of North American “culture” and 
society.  Indeed, the foreseeable social consequences of Nixon’s 
“silent/moral majority” and “strict construction” rhetoric were clear 
enough that this identity-inflected political argument was directed 
chiefly at populations in the southern states of the former 
Confederacy, where they were deemed to be most politically popular, 
as part of the so-called “southern strategy” that successfully handed 
the presidency to the Republicans in 1969, and for most of the 
elections since then, thus breaking the liberal sway begun in 1932 
with Franklin Roosevelt’s first landslide.44  From the beginning of this 
reaction to that legacy and its aftermath, a principal strategy of the 
gathering culture wars was to recapture the federal judiciary and 
cabin the federal judicial review power as a tool of social 
transformation—and to reclaim that power as a tool of social 
stratification.45 
 
backlash kulturkampf calculate, correctly, that their privilege and dominance vis a vis 
historically subordinated groups is best preserved, and perhaps amplified, by 
disabling the possibility of federal power to reform historic injustices that have 
enriched and empowered them.  See infra Part II; see also supra note 17 and sources 
cited therein. 
 44 See KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969) (laying out 
the principal contemporary account of this “southern strategy” and its ideological 
purposes); A. JAMES REICHLEY, CONSERVATIVES IN AN AGE OF CHANGE: THE NIXON AND 
FORD ADMINISTRATIONS, 174-204 and 407-20 (1981) (providing a substantive analysis 
of the strategy and policy choices or issues used to help implement it); TERREL L. 
RHODES, REPUBLICANS IN THE SOUTH: VOTING FOR THE STATE HOUSE, VOTING FOR THE 
WHITE HOUSE, 19-39 (2000) (documenting the actual impact of this strategy on 
voting patterns since then to conclude that in “presidential elections in the latter 
third of the twentieth century, the South became increasingly susceptible to 
Republican incursions” and that Nixon’s 1972 re-election “is a useful starting point 
for an examination of contemporary Republican strength in the South” due, in great 
measure, to his southern strategy) 
 45 This recapture and redirection of the federal judicial power has been managed 
on two levels: public and legal, or political and jurisprudential.  In public or political 
spheres or contexts, backlashing judges and politicians seek to exaggerate the 
breadth of the precedents they wish to overturn, portraying them as merely 
illegitimate handiwork of self-indulgent judges bent on “legislating from the bench” 
a mass destruction of liberty and justice.  In this way, neocolonial elites help to fan 
the politics of fear and control that fuel backlash and provide foot soldiers for the 
electoral dimensions of today’s kulturkampf.  See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 18, at 293 
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Consequently, in the tumultuous decades since the 1970s and 
80s, much of the impetus for the dismantlement of 
antidiscrimination legislation and precedent has come from the 
highest levels of the federal bench.  Over time, this backlash 
campaign of redirection has generated an environment of obsessive 
attention to the roles, powers and actions of federal judicial 
appointees, which both informs mainstream public discourses and 
increasingly pervades legal culture.46  Indeed, “constitutional theory 
 
(“[T]he conservative caricature of the liberal Justices pictures them just making up 
whatever law suited their sense of justice.  The conservative promise is that their 
replacements will not be so free-wheeling.”).  In this way, they play the kind of 
“wedge politics” that propelled into legislative and executive office the politicians 
who thereby have taken control of the federal government during the past two or so 
decades of cultural warfare—politicians like Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and 
George Bush—and who then used these public positions to help install into power 
today’s judges precisely so they would engineer this redirection of the federal judicial 
power.  See supra notes 41-43 and sources cited therein.  Oftentimes, “wedge politics” 
are “identity politics” that seek to pit majority-identitied social groups against the 
nation’s historically marginalized minorities, as exemplified by the uses of race, 
nationality, ethnicity, sex and sexuality to fuel a politics of fear and control that help 
to animate the backlash factions.  See Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17, 
at 1427, n.73 (discussing identity-inflected wedge issues and their uses to incite 
backlash politics). 
In legal or jurisprudential venues or contexts, on the other hand, backlashing 
judges and politicians seek to constrict the significance of targeted precedents, 
sometimes explaining away or narrowing their holdings and distinguishing or 
mischaracterizing their facts—or simply insisting that those precedents did not mean 
what they said.  A classic example is the backlash attempt, beginning with Bowers v. 
Hardwick’s 5-4 ruling in 1986, to baldly re-characterize the body of liberty-privacy 
precedents since the 1923 ruling in Meyer v. Nebraska.  Thus, the ongoing backlash 
effort to cast that long line of cases as “flattened-out collections of private acts” rather 
than a “continuous stream of rulings about human freedom” is paradigmatic of this 
tactic.  See Tribe, supra note 18, at 1932-38.  For a detailed discussion, see Valdes, Four 
Score, supra note 17.  This disingenuous manipulation of information and position in 
popular versus legal venues—so transparently calculated to suit the politics of varied 
settings and audiences and to promote always the agendas of backlash in and 
through them—has succeeded in making reaction and retrenchment the dominant 
feature of today’s sociolegal zeitgeist, at least for this historical moment. 
 46 Ironically, or perhaps predictably, this campaign of recapture and redirection 
has prompted advocates seeking to vindicate civil rights claims to plea before 
alternative venues, both political and juridical; indeed, in a remarkable modern-day 
display of original theories of North American federalism in action, the past two 
decades have witnessed state courts granting the relief that federal judges 
increasingly dismiss with disdain.  In the original theory of vertical federalism, a 
touted virtue was that aggrieved citizens would be able to shift loyalties, and to seek 
alternative forms of redress from, their state or national governments: when one (or 
the other) is hostile to a class of the populace, the theory goes, vertical federalism 
allows the possibility that the those groups or persons will be vindicated by the 
alternative sovereign.  James Madison provided the quintessential articulation of this 
theory in Federalist No. 10 and No. 51 (presenting the conceptual framework for 
and reasoning behind the “compound republic of America” and specifying its 
beneficial distinctions as compared to a direct democracy or a monarchy).  And, 
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in the past several decades has been obsessed with the question of 
how to constrain judges exercise of will.”47  From a backlash 
perspective, the focus of the obsession is on constraining perceived or 
actual exercises of judicial power—whether willful or not—that may 
further the “liberal” social changes associated with New Deal and/or 
Civil Rights lawmaking, and accompanied with very little attention to 
exercises of will that accomplish their retrenchment.48 
But backlashers’ ab/use of the federal judicial power to de-
legitimize social justice claims—in particular those grounded in New 
Deal and Civil Rights sources of law and policy—and the obsessive 
attention they have drawn to the notion of “judicial legislation” in 
turn have drawn increasingly sharp critiques of backlash 
jurisprudence, including serious questions about a new wave of 
“judicial activism” in the construction of social and legal 
retrenchment—a new wave that in conceptual, doctrinal and political 
terms harkens back to tense times in the history of American law.49  
Those times go back to the very origins—and eventual establishment 
in the late 1930s despite “activist” judicial opposition—of the “liberal” 
legacy that backlashers strive now to roll back.50  That confrontation 
 
indeed, during the past two decades of intensifying cultural warfare against 
traditionally subordinated groups, the state courts of jurisdictions as diverse as 
Vermont and Hawaii or Massachusetts and Alaska have recognized social justice 
claims that the newly stacked federal courts have made haste to rebuff in ringing 
terms.  See, e.g., Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17, at 1435-38 and 
sources cited therein on cultural warfare and prong one in some of these states; see 
also DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE (2004) (focusing on 
Vermont specifically).  Thus, even while federal tribunals are turned against the 
nation’s most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and persons, state tribunals have 
provided them safe harbors from time to time, and this divergence also helps to 
bring the questionable nature of backlash jurisprudential moves or assertions into 
sharper relief.  For example, in 1986, Kentucky's Supreme Court invalidated that 
state's sodomy statute.  See Special Feature, Commonwealth v. Wasson: Invalidating 
Kentucky's Sodomy Statute, 81 KY. L. J. 423 (1992-93).  See generally Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q 723 (1991) and Paula A. Brantner, Note, Removing Bricks from a Wall of 
Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 
495 (1992) (both on state constitutions and judiciaries as alternative venues for the 
vindication of social justice claims to a hostile federal judiciary). 
 47 Sullivan, supra note 18, at 293. 
 48 For an illustrative sketch of some examples, see infra Part II. 
 49 See infra note 52 and accompanying text on the famous 1930s confrontation 
between the Court and the President. 
 50 That era’s willfulness, sometimes denominated “Lochnerism” because of the 
notorious ruling in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), that exemplified it 
“hovers like a specter to be continually banished.”  Sullivan, supra note 18, at 293.  
From an OutCritical perspective, today’s five-person majority does seem bent on 
replaying that a kind of willfulness whenever it “suits their sense of justice.”  Id.   Yet 
the political context in which they act is diametrically different, a difference that 
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severely discredited the Court institutionally before it finally allowed 
the New Deal to be legislated, after several landslide elections, thus 
clearing the stage for the succeeding “liberal” era of executive and 
legislative social programs that backlash jurisprudence currently 
strives to dismantle through the culture wars.51  Since 1937’s “switch 
in time,” that multi-year effort of willful judges in control of the 
Supreme Court’s judicial review power to thwart state and federal 
New Deal initiatives in the name of the Constitution has become 
widely recognized as the paradigmatic example of “judicial activism” 
and unprincipled constitutional adjudication—an example 
definitively disavowed by successive judges since then52 but that 
“hovers like a spectre to be continually banished.”53 
Nonetheless, backlash jurisprudence today seems determined to 
engineer by law a resurrection of the pre-1937 ideology advocated by 
those activist judges—at least in effect, if not by design.  Not 
coincidentally, for example, the 1930s activists had valorized the same 
kinds of federalism claims based on “states’ rights” and property 
rights, and had demonized federal power to prevent local abuses of 
child laborers, consumers, women and other politically or 
economically vulnerable persons and groups, as do today’s backlash 
activists54—a choice of “values” and interpretations that historically 
 
permits today’s willfulness to go unchecked if not affirmatively applauded and 
politically rewarded.  See infra note 57 and accompanying text.  
 51 For an overview of that era and its legacies in constitutional terms, see G. 
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2001) (elaborating an 
analysis that seeks to revise conventional understandings of that period and reactions 
to it since then).  Since the 1930s, a “collective canonization and demonization” of 
federal judges as a class, and of particular individuals has taken hold based on 
“ideological labels” that, in turn, have become kulturkampf buzzwords.  Id. at 209.  
During the past several decades of cultural warfare, this strategic process of 
ideological canonization and demonization also has helped to produce the 
“obsession” over exercises of “will” that abuse the federal judicial power and that 
“hovers like a spectre to be continually banished.”  See Sullivan, supra note 18 at 293.  
Ironically, or cynically, backlash judges routinely make full use of the potential for 
judicial activism under judicial review.  Despite their longstanding condemnations of 
the practice—a condemnation that is a professed bedrock of backlash 
jurisprudence—they wield that very power as actively as any judge ever did.  See infra 
Part II and supra note 17 and sources cited therein. 
 52 See infra note 56.  For notable accounts of those times, see WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); 
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court Packing” Plan, 
1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347; see also WHITE, supra note 51. 
 53 Sullivan, supra note 18, at 293. 
 54 The 1930s activist judges anchored their opposition to the New Deal in the 
asserted liberty right of contract, which as they interpreted it repeatedly favored the 
interests of big business and employers, but required increasingly obvious judicial 
gyrations to maintain.  E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a 
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state fair employment statue limiting the working day to no more than 10 hours and 
the work week to no more than 60 hours on the grounds that this regulation 
“interferes with the right of contract between employer and employee” alike).  That 
judicial imposition of economic liberty, as the judges themselves since have 
acknowledged, exemplified the Framers’ concerns over “judgment” and “will”—the 
latter, will, being a judge’s abuse of a court’s power to effectuate the judge’s 
preferred policy position. E.g., The Federalist No. 10, at 226, 230 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed. 1981)  (“The courts must declare the sense of the 
law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the 
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the 
legislative body.”).  For incisive accounts of “original” concerns and exchanges 
regarding federal judicial power and its potential abuse by individuals appointed to 
be judges, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1996); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (1988).  By 1937, that prime historical example of the legitimate 
concern over judicial activism had become untenable, and came to an embarrassing 
end that continues to haunt and embarrass the institution, as its invocation in liberty-
privacy cases ranging from Griswold to Bowers and Casey pointedly show.  See Valdes, 
Four Score, supra note 17 (comparing these cases and their express concerns over 
judicial activism).    
Today, as Griswold, Bowers, and progeny also show, the same basic notion—
“liberty” protected by due process—is at the heart of privacy jurisprudence, and of 
the backlashing efforts to arrest it.  Id.  This similarity—the focus on “liberty”—lends 
itself to superficial comparisons designed to promote backlash kulturkampf; in 
particular, as Bowers specifically illustrates, this similarity permits strategic but 
inapposite assertions that today’s recognition of liberty-privacy is as much of an 
illegitimate judicial concoction as the “judicial activism” that blocked reform 
legislation two generations ago under the asserted liberty to enter into private 
commercial contracts: even though some of the same judges articulated both the 
economic and the personal aspects of liberty during the 1920s, one key distinction 
between the jurisprudence delineating each is that personal liberty—the line of cases 
elaborating liberty-privacy from 1923 onward—now is the cumulative work-product 
of multiple judges across ideologies and generations, each of which “built” 
substantively on precedent, rather than the concentrated handiwork of a small cadre 
of judges single-handedly engineering an abrupt break from established 
jurisprudential patterns to promote a larger coordinated campaign aiming to 
redirect the long-term evolution of law and society.   
In this way, since the 1980s backlashes have methodically pursued a doctrinal 
resurrection of the rights of the propertied as the preferred form of liberty.  See, e.g., 
Symposium, On Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 183 (1992), including perhaps most 
notably, Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Right, id. at 187; see also Richard 
A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1988); RICHARD A. ESPTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).  See generally Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process 
and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983).  In the 
politically pivotal decade of 1980s, this revival of property rights arguments in great 
measure marched under the rubric of Public Choice Theory, and more generally as 
“law and economics,” both of which envision intensified judicial scrutiny of  
legislative actions that burden the rights of “minorities” defined by economic wealth.  
See generally Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral?  The 
Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, 
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); William H. Riker & Barry 
R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of 
Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373 (1988).  Cf. Thomas C. Grey, The 
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and consistently have undergirded neocolonial power hierarchies 
materially and socially in the United States since the ratification of 
the Constitution.55  Thus, while the particulars between then and now 
 
Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986); Steven Kelman, Public Choice 
and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INT. 80 (1987). 
 55 Also not coincidentally, then, “class” and other forms of identity, such as race 
and ethnicity, remain structurally and empirically intertwined.  See, e.g., Roy L. 
Brooks, The Ecology of Inequality: The Rise of the African-American Underclass, 8 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER J. 1 (1991) (exploring the reasons for the continuing segregation of 
African Americans in pockets of poverty); Paul Ong & Suzanne J. Hee, Economic 
Diversity, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: ECONOMIC DIVERSITY, ISSUES AND 
POLICIES 31-56 (Paul Ong ed., 1994) (comparing the earnings of Asian Americans to 
Whites and noting that nearly half of all Americans of Southeast Asian descent live in 
poverty); Gerald P. Lopez, Learning About Latinos, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 363 
(1998) (discussing the socioeconomic and demographic condition of Latina/o 
communities in the United States); Diedre Martinez & Sonia M. Perez, Toward a 
Latino Anti-Poverty Agenda, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 55 (1993) (exploring ways 
of eradicating or mitigating the impoverishment of Latinas/os in the United States).  
For a current “official” portrait, see Council of Economic Advisers, CHANGING 
AMERICA:  INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING BY RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN 2 (1998) (noting that “race and ethnicity continue to be salient predictors of 
well-being in American society . . . [affecting] health, education, and economic 
status”).  Thus, while “significant progress has been made in expanding the promise 
of America to members of minority groups . . . the legacy of race and color continues 
to limit opportunities.  The life chances of minorities and people of color in the 
United States are constrained by this legacy AND by continued discrimination and 
racial disparities that are often the result of discrimination”—the combined effects of 
the past as the present.  See The President’s Initiative on Race, THE ADVISORY BOARD’S 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 59, Sept. 1998 (emphasis added).  Despite the New Deal 
and Civil Rights reforms, neocolonial socioeconomic patterns not only remain firmly 
in place but the divisive material gaps they create seem to be growing under the sway 
of backlash lawmaking.  E.g., Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, A 20-Year Glitch 
in America, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1993, at A15 (discussing how "income inequality and 
economic hardship" widened the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" 
during the 1980s, during which time "the ranks of the rich increased to an all-time 
high" as the impact of Reagan’s backlash policies took hold). 
The cumulative socioeconomic impact of these “constraints” in turn are 
reflected in the demographics of power centers in North American society.  Fortune 
1000 boards continue to be “bastions of aging white males”—they account for three 
quarters of all board seats that control corporate policy in North America and, 
increasingly by the extension of globalization, the world.  See, e.g., Good Old Boys’ 
Network Still Rules Corporate Boards, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at 1; see also HISPANIC 
ASSOCIATION ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, SUMMARY, 2002-03 CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE STUDY (Dec. 2002) (reporting that “Hispanics” account for 1.8% of the 
10,417 board seats in the Fortune 1000 list).  The same phenomenon is manifest on 
the federal judiciary, a similar demographic bastion that reflects the same 
neocolonial legacies of history on this continent: two thirds of all federal judges in 
2002 were white (and openly heterosexual) males.  See Alliance for Justice, Status of 
the Judiciary: April 2002 Summary Update, at http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial; 
Federal Judicial Center, The Federal Judges Biographical Database, at, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history.  These judges in turn seem “blindly” to reproduce 
themselves, demographically at least.  By example, most of the Supreme Court clerks 
in 2001 were, again, mostly white (and apparently heterosexual) males.  See Tony 
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of course are varied, in ultimate and practical terms today’s 
backlashing judges seek to undo the historical, structural and 
substantive significance of the “switch in time”—especially in the 
form of constitutional case law—and to bring about a restoration of 
legitimacy to the long-discredited assertions of the 1930s activists.56  
The backlash project of today is to bring back a return of the old 
deal—the status quo that framed North American society before the 
lawmaking eras ushered by the New Deal in the mid-1930s and built 
upon since then during the Civil Rights period of the 1960s. 
This project is made possible by a major and key difference 
between the activism of the judges during the first and second halves 
of the Twentieth Century—a difference, in fact, that helps to explain 
the success of today’s activist judges despite their have taken up the 
same basic agenda and posture as their 1930s antecedents: the judges 
of the 1930s sought to interject the federal judicial power to thwart 
the policymaking choices of contemporaneous legislative or political 
majorities, whereas today’s judges seek to deploy the same power to 
unravel the established policymaking choices and precedents of their 
legislative, executive and judicial predecessors.  The willfulness of the 
1930s judges was checked by the historically contemporaneous 
reactions—and timely retaliation—of the Legislative and Executive 
branches, famously described as Franklin Roosevelt’s “court-packing” 
 
Mauro, Court Loses Ground on Minority Clerks, THE RECORDER, Oct. 30, 2001, at 1 
(reporting both the historic and current “dearth” of clerks other than white (and 
openly heterosexual) men).   Finally, and similarly, the same histories and legacies of 
constraint have produced the same demographic disparities that still define the legal 
professorate of the United States today.  See infra note 72. 
 56 For their part, since that embarrassing collision the judges of the Supreme 
Court repeatedly have distinguished between “economic” liberty and “personal” 
liberty under substantive due process on the grounds that majoritarian efforts to 
regulate the former are no more than state management of the market while 
majoritarian efforts to regulate the latter amount to a state take-over of individual 
autonomy or destiny.  This distinction substantively amounts to acknowledgement 
that the state has wide leeway in the regulation of individual participation in the 
“public” spheres of economic markets but narrow leeway in the regulation intimate 
choices in the “private” spheres of education, relationships and lifestyle through 
which individuals typically endeavor to direct their social destiny in the course of 
living their everyday lives.  E.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 
(1952) (upholding state regulation of working hours, noting that “if our recent cases 
mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic and social 
affairs to legislative decision”); see also Lincoln Federal Union v. Northwestern Iron & 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (upholding state regulation of employment contracts 
while emphasizing that economic liberty is generally subject to intensive state 
regulation because such regulations “do not run afoul of some specific federal 
constitutional prohibition” and, in addition, it should be noted, because 
constitutional text and design grant the federal government extensive powers over 
commercial activities).   
  
2005 KULTURKAMPF TO RESURRECT THE OLD DEAL 1433 
scheme.  No such check from the other branches exists today, as 
activist judges march in substantial lockstep with, and in the service 
of, the cultural and political imperatives made dominant by backlash 
kulturkampf in all three branches of the federal government.57  
 
 57 See Leuchtenburg, supra note 52.  Thus, it bears emphasis that today’s backlash 
activism is more than simply a form of judicially imposed legal and social 
retrenchment.  Today’s law-politics synchronicity was orchestrated, and is enabled, by 
the multi-pronged pursuit of cultural warfare.  In fact, today’s backlash activism, in 
great measure, is a direct product of backlash kulturkamp: the backlashing 
politicians who have taken control of the political branches in and through the 
culture wars have installed today’s activist judges into power with a clear sense of 
purpose, made publicly explicit from time to time: precisely to perform this rights 
take-back.  See supra notes 41-43 and sources cited therein.  Beginning in the 1980s, 
the second Reagan administration intensified the use of ideology to tailor judicial 
appointments and, in time, judicial behavior to the backlash agenda.  See infra notes 
66-67 and sources cited therein. In short, today’s federal judges practice their 
neocolonial activism as scripted by the cultural (and legal) politics of their 
appointments to the federal bench—appointments that, as discussed below, are both 
a product and a tool of backlash kulturkampf.  See infra Part II.  Thus, 
contemporaneous retaliation by the Congress or the President to restrain the judges 
is not only politically unavailable as a “check and balance” on runaway activism, but 
to the contrary, today’s backlash activists are politically applauded and rewarded. 
Moreover, and perhaps even more perversely from a separation of powers 
perspective, federal judges who dare to resist substantial obeisance to the political 
demands or ideological imperatives of backlash kulturkampf in their opinions have 
become the targets of retaliation, receiving threats of hostile, disciplinary scrutiny 
from the politicians in control of the other two branches.  See Bob Herbert, In 
America: A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2000, at A29 (documenting the 
coordinated effort to force judicial compliance with backlash imperatives); Edward 
Walsh & Dan Eggen, Aschcroft Orders Tally of Lighter Sentences: Critics Say He Wants 
“Blacklist” of Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at A1 (reporting a Justice Department 
directive ordering U.S. attorneys across the country to be “more aggressive” in 
reporting judicial deviations from the federal sentencing guidelines, which had been 
promulgated in large part to discipline “liberal” judges painted as “soft” on criminals 
and too sympathetic to the constitutional rights of the accused).  Ironically, the 
Supreme Court recently held those guidelines unconstitutional.  See United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).   
The obvious aim of these law-politics dynamic is to cow independent judges, and 
to coerce as may be necessary their conformance with the politics of backlash—so 
much so that even the backlash-identified current Chief Justice recently was 
prompted to complain of this concerted effort at congressional intimidation of 
federal judges.  See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law as Infringing on 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at 14 (reporting Rehnquist’s “unsually pointed” 
criticism to enactment of a federal statute similar to the Ascroft directive, which 
“places federal judges under special scrutiny for sentences that fall short of those 
called for the federal sentencing guidelines”).  A year later, Rehnquist sounded the 
same skeptical note in his annual report on the state of the federal judiciary: “There 
have been suggestions to impeach federal judges who issue decisions regarded by 
some as out of the mainstream.  And there have been several bills introduced in the 
last Congress that would limit jurisdiction of the federal courts to decide 
constitutional challenges to certain kinds of government action.” These actions 
include efforts “to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to the 
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, to the display of the Ten 
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Coupled with concurrent efforts to control electoral politics and 
federal public resources, this focus on controlling the federal judicial 
power has helped to establish the principal contours of backlash 
kulturkampf. 
B. Backlash Agendas and the Prongs of War: Identity and Politics, 
Status and Power 
Today’s culture wars are organized generally around three 
principal sociolegal offensives.  The three work in tandem socially 
and legally.  They are interactive and mutually-reinforcing, and help 
to sustain varied forms of privilege, discrimination and subordination 
based on race, ethnicity, class, sex, culture, sexual orientation and the 
like, which similarly interlock in law and society.  As evidenced by the 
illustrative mini-case study presented in this Afterword’s 
counterpart,58 as well as by the summary capsules sketched below, in 
this scheme a combination of identity-based biases and prejudices—
fairly described as a “Euro-heteropatriarchy”—predominates: a 
combination of supremacist ideologies that formed in Europe, in 
particular its northwestern environs, and was inflicted on the world 
via European conquest and Eurocentric commerce.  This particular 
combination of identity ideology favors the white European male who 
is both heterosexual and masculine.  It favors European-identified 
cultures—customs, languages, religions.  It combines, in the form of 
neocolonial identity politics, the racism, nativism, androsexism, 
heterosexism and cultural chauvinism of those regions, which in the 
centuries of colonialism were exported globally and, more recently, 
are being reinforced through the social, economic, cultural, legal and 
political processes of corporate globablization.59  In purpose and 
 
Commandments on government property and to the Defense of Marriage Act, a 
federal law that permits states to withhold recognition of same-sex marriages 
performed in other states” despite constitutional commitments and norms of mutual 
recognition.”  These and similar political efforts targeting judicial independence, 
Rehnquist concluded, “could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort 
to intimidate individual judges.”  See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for 
Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at 10; see also Same-Sex Foes Win a Round, 
MIA. HERALD, July 23, 2004, at 5A (reporting that the House of Representatives had 
passed a bill “to prevent federal courts from ordering states to recognize same-sex 
marriages sanctioned by other states”).  As these examples show, the political efforts 
to control the federal judicial review power track the neocolonial identity politics 
and social agendas of backlash kulturkampf.  See also infra Part II. 
 58 See Valdes, Culture by Law, supra note 8. 
 59 See Francisco Valdes Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, 
Gender and Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUM. 161 (1996) (describing 
some basic tenets of Euro-heteropatriarchal social ideologies); Francisco Valdes, 
Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American Heteropatriarchy, 71 
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effect, the culture wars aim to reanimate the hegemony of colonial-
era traditions within the United States, interrupting anew a slow and 
troubled historical progression from formal subordination, to formal 
equality and antidiscrimination, to, perhaps some day, 
antisubordination and social transformation.  Domestically, the 
neocolonial imperatives of backlash identity politics are being 
reinforced via the three “prongs” or fronts of the culture wars. 
1. Electoral Politics and Raw Majoritarianism: A Return of 
Democratic Despotism? 
The first of these, the targeted use of majoritarian politics to 
repeal or undermine “liberal” legislation or precedent, is primary 
because it sets the stage for the second and third prongs or fronts.  
The basic tactic here is straightforward and time-honored: electing to 
office politicians that are specifically committed to legislating the 
“social agenda” identified with neocolonial supremacy.60  But the aim 
of this kulturkampf—control of the “soul” of the nation and its future 
through wholesale exclusions of outgroups from civic life and other 
forms of rank oppression—does not represent a simple case of 
politics as usual, as the Supreme Court itself was prompted to 
recognize in cases like Romer and Lawrence.61  The basic objective of 
backlash kulturkampf—and in particular the national cultural 
cleansing desired by ardent backlashers to permanently cast the 
nation’s demography and character in the image and imperatives of 
the original immigrants—marks a key difference between the politics 
of fear and control pursued through today’s cultural warfare from the 
garden variety of electoral power politics expected to occur under the 
Constitution.62 Thus, quite explicitly by the 1990s, this primary front 
 
UMKC L. REV. 377 (2002) (elaborating Euro-heteropatriarchy); see also Valdes, Beyond 
Sexual Orientation, supra note 17 at 1427-28 and sources cited therein. 
 60 For examples, see Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17, at 1431, n.91. 
 61 See Valdes, Four Score, supra note 17. 
 62 In keeping with the identity-driven objectives of the culture wars, this agenda 
of reaction and retrenchment revolves around several recurrent themes: elimination 
of affirmative action across the board; restriction of immigration from nonwhite 
societies; reduction of even minimal “safety-net” benefits to the poor; and especially 
to the immigrant poor; constriction of women’s reproductive rights, including 
prohibition of abortion; deactivation of environmental safeguards; de jure exclusion 
of sexual minorities from the “tent” of formal equality.  This backlash agenda, 
conversely, simultaneously seeks enactment of English-supremacy laws, and of tax 
cuts, subsidies and rebates for wealthy corporations, groups and individuals, and of 
myriad other social and economic proposals that foreseeably, if not intentionally, 
serve to shore up the social, cultural, political and economic value of being a white, 
male, heterosexual, middle-class heir of earlier, perhaps colonizing, immigrants from 
northwestern Europe.  See generally supra notes 38-40 and sources cited therein; see 
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or prong of the culture wars had been mobilized in the name of the 
“angry white male” bent on taking back what he still imagines always 
to have been naturally, eternally and righteously his on this 
continent.63  Packaged in the guise of formal “democracy,” 
backlashing politicians relentlessly have pursued this first line or 
prong of the culture wars, repeatedly exploiting culturally oriented 
“wedge issues” to create sociopolitical polarization and, in the 
process, to re-seize federal lawmaking power and thereby 
reconsolidate the cultural supremacy of the nation’s “traditional” 
socioeconomic elites.64 
At the federal level, as already noted, this core effort is 
proximately traceable to the politics of Richard Nixon and his 
assertion of a “silent majority” seething quietly against the social 
effects of the preceding legal progress in domestic civil rights,65 but 
the watershed moment was the election of Ronald Reagan and the 
occupation of the White House by his savvy coterie of handlers, who 
especially in the second term used every institutional means available 
to arm backlashers for the culture wars.66  Indeed, after Nixon’s 
 
also infra Part II.   
 63 See Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17 at 1429-30 and sources cited 
therein (discussing this type of essentialized majoritarian identity politics, and their 
activation to mobilize foot-soldiers in the political campaigns that constitute the 
culture wars’ first prong). 
 64 To pursue this goal, this first prong has taken two principal forms.  The first, as 
indicated by the historical notes above, has been the capture and domestication of 
the ‘representative’ branches of the federal and state governments.  But when this 
conventional sort of electoral politics have fallen short, as they sometimes do, 
majoritarian cultural warriors have turned this first line of attack toward ‘popular’ 
referenda to commandeer policy-making when elected officials hesitate to play 
backlash politics.  At the state level, this ‘direct’ form of electoral attack has 
produced Prop 187, and then Prop 209, in the bellwether state of California, which 
materially and symbolically have made criminals of the undocumented and 
resegregated state educational institutions.  This form of attack also is aptly 
illustrated by the ‘popular’ campaigns to overturn judicial antidiscrimination rulings 
under the state constitutions of Hawaii and Alaska in same-sex marriage cases 
through a direct amendment of those states’ fundamental charters.  For examples, 
see Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17, at 1435.  This use of “direct 
democracy” at the local level to circumvent the processes and outcomes of 
“deliberative democracy” at all levels of public governance—at least when such 
deliberation fails to produce backlash policymaking—in turn has raised questions 
about the meaning of both kinds of “democracy” in a society putatively devoted not 
only to republican self-government for its own sake, but as a means toward a 
foundational yet long-postponed aspiration that still adorns the portico of the 
Supreme Court and other public buildings: “equality and justice for all.”  See generally 
supra note 46 and sources cited therein. 
 65 See supra notes 41 and sources cited therein.   
 66 See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Appointments at Mid-Term: Shaping the 
Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 335 (1982-83);  Jon Gottschall, Reagan’s 
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electioneering, Reagan’s clearly was the next key national milestone 
in the build-up to today’s kulturkampf through electoral politics: his 
eight years in the White House consolidated the dynamics of cultural 
warfare in various ways along all three prongs or fronts of these 
culture wars.  Of these, two are perhaps most notable.  The first was 
his sweeping re-composition of the federal judiciary: upon leaving 
office, Reagan had appointed more than half of all sitting federal 
judges, including one third of the current Supreme Court Justices, 
plus the current Chief Justice.67  The second most notable effect was 
that Reagan’s years, compounding those of Nixon’s, provided the 
training grounds for the troops that succeeded to power in the 1990s, 
including those that in 1994 were swept into power under Newt 
Gingrich’s “Contract with America” campaign.68  They were, as noted 
 
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 
JUDICATURE 48 (1986-87);  Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing the 
Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989) (all on President Reagan’s judicial 
appointments and their ideological effects on the federal judiciary).  By the turn of 
the century, President Reagan’s escalated ideological scrutiny and techniques to 
ensure ideological purity had produced a paralyzing polarization in the confirmation 
process, especially in election years: in 1988, when Ronald Reagan faced a 
Democratic Senate, the senators approved 42 of his judicial nominees; in 1992, when 
George Bush similarly faced a Democratic Senate, the senators approved 66 of his 
judicial nominees; in 1996, when Bill Clinton faced a Republican Senate, the 
senators approved a mere 17 of his judicial nominees.  See Frank Davies, Senate 
Stalling New Judges: Republicans Block New Judgeships, MIA. HERALD, Feb. 6, 2000, at 1A 
(reporting the increased blocking of federal judicial appointments on ideological 
grounds that comport to kulturkampf politics, and displaying how the culture wars’ 
prongs operate interactively). 
 67 During his eight years in power, Reagan secured the appointments of Sandra 
Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, as well as the elevation of 
William Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice. 
 68 Among the rising foot soldiers of those years was a young speechwriter-staffer 
from the Nixon years by the name of Patrick J. Buchanan, who later vied for the 
Republican nomination himself.  It was he, as explained earlier, who issued the 
backlashers’ formal declaration of cultural warfare from the podium of the 1992 
Republican National Convention, announcing a new campaign for the “soul of 
America” through which these self-denominated cultural warriors of retrenchment 
intended to “take back . . . our cities, and take back our culture and take back our 
country . . . block by block.”  See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.  Thus, 
while the storms of backlash have been gathering since the 1960s and 1970s, perhaps 
the pivotal moment of triumph in the steady escalation of culture war through 
majoritarian electoral politics came a mere two years after Buchanan’s official 
declaration of 1992—in the 1994 congressional elections, which put into legislative 
office the standard bearers of the “Contract with America” and its agenda of 
buttressing existing structures of neocolonial supremacy through sociolegal 
retrenchment.  See Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons Conservatives to Come “Home,” 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1992, at A12; Paul Galloway, Divided We Stand: Today’s 
“Cultural War” Goes Deeper than Political Slogans, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at C1.  Since 
then, as noted immediately above, this social conflict has been waged with a 
vengeance to “take back” the civil rights gains of the past century in the name of the 
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above and in the parlance of their day, the rising representatives of 
the “angry white male.”69  This “front” of the culture wars, as this 
sketch indicates, exploits the numerical, structural, economic and 
social capital arrogated and accumulated by the original immigrants, 
particularly those from England, and retained to this very day by their 
successors-in-interest for the private benefit not only of the earlier 
immigrants from the colonial era but also of their neocolonial heirs 
today and tomorrow.70 
The cumulative cultural and institutional effects of this first 
prong or front have been twofold: first, a substantial gutting of civil 
rights law and the steady (re)normalization of a social environment 
 
“angry white male.”  See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE 
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING 
BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA’S CULTURE WAR (1994). 
 69 See, e.g., Grant Reeher & Joseph Cammarano, In Search of the Angry White Male: 
Gender, Race and Issues in the 1994 Elections, in MIDTERM: THE ELECTIONS OF 1994 IN 
CONTEXT (Philip A. Klinkner ed., 1996). 
 70 It bears at least passing note that, this backlash resort, or deference, to “direct 
democracy” in the name of the federal Constitution is supremely ironic: it turns the 
theory of that constitution, as articulated by its federalist framers, on its head.  From 
their original perspective, the federalists considered raw majoritarianism as a form of 
“democratic despotism” akin to monarchical despotism—a perspective formed in the 
crucible of both the revolutionary period in the 1770s as well as the critical period 
immediately afterward, spanning the 1780s.  During this period of sovereignty, the 
legislatures of the autonomous former colonies, usually elected directly by the 
eligible voters of the state, enacted statutes that disturbed the property claims of the 
revolutionary elites—and that helped to prompt the energy they put behind the new 
Constitution’s adoption.  This experience with the “tyranny of the majority” caused 
James Madison and other key framers to emphasize “deliberative democracy” as a 
check on mob rule in the name of majoritarian pregogative.  In this way, the 
propertied local and national elites of the first generation became the first “minority” 
to seek constitutional protection from the dictates of rampant (from their 
perspective) formal democracy.  In this way, they set both the stage and the example 
for succeeding minorities, including those under attack via raw majoritarianism 
mechanisms in today’s backlash kulturkampf.  E.g., The Federalist No. 10 and No. 51 
(James Madison) (discussing the problems they perceived with direct democracy); see 
also, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 393-417  
(1969) (describing this “Critical Period” of direct democracy or “democratic 
despotism” leading up to the Constitutional Convention).  Though immediate self 
interest may not have been the sole motivation for the revolutionary and propertied 
elites of the various former colonies to jettison the Articles of Confederation and to 
replace them with the markedly different design of the Constitution, their 
preoccupation with property rights prompted James Madison to conclude that the 
new charter must be structured to ensure that “the rights of persons were subjected 
to those of property.” See WOOD, supra note 70, at 410 (quoting Madison’s 
correspondence to Jefferson).  Since then, this specific focus on “property versus 
democracy” among the framing generation has been widely acknowledged as a key, if 
not exclusive, motivation for the constitutional compromises actually forged in 
Philadelphia.  For an excellent review, see generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990).  
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increasingly hostile to immigrants, sexual minorities, racial and 
ethnic minorities, women, the poor, the disabled, and other Others; 
and, second, the use of this electoral clout to launch the second 
prong or front of the culture wars.  This second prong, the 
installation into lifetime federal judgeships of persons who will use 
federal judicial powers to reinforce the gains made under the culture 
wars’ first prong or front, is a strategic move made both to protect 
backlash legislation as well as to clip back offensive precedent.  The 
two prongs, as this brief sketch indicates, work hand in hand. 
2. Judicial Review, Judicial Will and Backlash 
Jurisprudence 
The second line or prong of attack amounts to court-packing, 
pure and simple, but on a massive scale.  Beginning with and since 
Nixon’s efforts, the national judiciary has been methodically 
restocked, as much as politically possible, on the basis of race, 
gender, class and—especially—ideology to restore positively the 
dominance of Euro-heteropatriarchal “tradition” and those it favors 
in law and society.71  Demographically and politically, this process has 
sustained the over-representation of white, male and heterosexual 
control over the judicial powers of the federal (and state) 
government.72 Rhetorically, they have raised and used the banner of 
“strict construction” when it comes specifically—and selectively—to 
civil and human rights, and to contract the so-called liberal legacy, 
whether expressed in legislative, executive or judicial forms of law 
and policy.  Coupled with equally strategic intonations, and selective 
versions, of history, tradition, democracy and federalism, backlash 
 
 71 The so-called “Federalist” Society has served as a key funnel in this process.  See 
Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9, at 279-80.  At first blush, this organization’s 
naming seems merely odd, given their embrace of classically antifederalist dogma, 
such as denunciation of federal power generally, and the attendant calls for a 
selective “strict construction” of federal authority coupled with an unbridled 
expansion of “states rights” under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.  See THE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph 
Ketcham ed. 1986) (summarizing the failed antifederalist agenda to defeat the 
ratification campaign of the federalist sponsors of the Constitution); see also infra 
notes 91-103 and accompanying text on recent backlash opinions displaying this dual 
approach to constitutional interpretation, coupling “strict” construction of federal 
authority with expansive construction of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 
 72 See Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9, at 282 and sources cited therein on 
the demography and ideology of the federal judiciary in recent years.  Not 
coincidentally, the legal academy of the United States reflects a similar demographic 
portrait today, as it did during the formative years of critical outsider jurisprudence.  
Id. at 277.  See also supra note 62 and sources cited therein (on Reagan’s 
recomposition of, and pivotal impact on, the make-up and ideology of the federal 
judiciary). 
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appointees have generated substantively and ideologically preferred 
outcomes, effectively re-tightening the grip of neocolonial traditions 
over both law and society.73  Tactically, the two key broad purposes 
behind this second line or prong are, first, to neutralize federal 
judicial review as an independent check on contemporary backlash 
lawmaking and, second, to overturn liberal (or otherwise 
inconvenient) precedents, or other sources of law, established during 
the hated New Deal-to-Civil Rights eras.  In these key ways, the second 
prong of the culture wars clears the way for the legislative or 
“democratic” lawmaking conduct, in turn enabled by backlashers’ 
successful campaigns under the their kulturkampf’s first prong—and 
even as the first prong also produces the power to make the 
appointments that will generate the necessary rulings. 
This second front or prong of the culture wars has produced the 
intended effect: turning the nation’s courts into passive or active 
tribunals, as the case may demand, so that backlash-identified 
interests generally may count on federal judges to enable sociolegal 
retrenchment and shield their backlash lawmaking from 
independent judicial scrutiny.  As a result, backlash jurisprudence is 
characterized both by mighty intonations of an urgent need for 
“judicial restraint” as a key part of federalism and separation-of-
powers concerns that in the preceding decades had been trampled by 
“liberal activist judges”—as well as by their own unhesitant use of 
judicial activism to sweep aside formal obstacles to their agenda of 
social retrenchment.  Despite their ringing denunciations of “liberal 
activism,” today’s backlash judges have exposed themselves to the 
same denunciations, and to charges bordering on hypocrisy or worse, 
in their transparent analytical gyrations to generate ideologically 
preferred outcomes.74 The jurisprudential results, and the categorical 
 
 73 See infra Part II. 
 74 Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb 12, 2001, at 48 
(noting that the decision in the Gore litigation was “not the first time in history that 
the Supreme Court has made a decision that called its fundamental legitimacy into 
question” but that this time was unique because of the direct meddling in electoral 
politics at the highest level).  According to one former Supreme Court clerk, these 
charges flew between the justices themselves, as well as their chambers.  See EDWARD 
LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME 
COURT 288-325 (1999) (the author clerked for Justice Blackmun in 1988 to 1989).  In 
addition, many scholars have pointed out the doctrinal or analytical oddities 
unveiled in backlash rulings.  See Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9, at 287-89 
and sources cited therein (providing a bibliography of recent scholarship 
questioning the substantive integrity of this jurisprudence).  This skepticism 
mushroomed after the intervention of the five-member backlash bloc and their 5-4 
demand that all vote counting be stopped in the 2000 presidential election, thereby 
claiming the power—for the first time in the nation’s history—effectively to select the 
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consistency of the social, economic and political “winners” and 
“losers” under the doctrinal re/formulations of backlash jurisprudes, 
perhaps are most crisply exemplified by the Supreme Court itself, as 
discussed below.75 
3. Public Resources, Identity Politics and Social 
Construction 
The third line or prong of attack is the targeted control of the 
federal spending power to fund or de-fund particular programs or 
policies, as the case may be, in order to accomplish de facto roll-backs 
that cannot be effectuated wholesale, or directly.  This third prong 
perhaps is best illustrated by the funding battles over abortion, legal 
aid for the poor, social services for immigrants and so-called ‘welfare 
mothers,’76 but it also is shown in the current campaign, under the 
notorious Solomon Amendments, to withhold federal funds—
including financial aid to students—from universities and colleges 
that do not permit military recruiters and ROTC programs to bring 
discrimination onto university campuses due to the military’s 
institutionalized policies of discrimination on the basis of sex, gender 
and sexual orientation.77  This third prong of the culture wars aims to 
reassert control over the federal budget to starve programs that aid 
foes and to nourish the power and coffers of friends.    Under this 
line of attack, working in tandem with the prior two lines of the 
culture wars, programs and policies that serve as lifelines to 
vulnerable communities and groups—including law students who 
need federal loans to secure an education—effectively are threatened 
or cut, even though backlashers may not have been able to muster 
the power to effectuate a direct, substantive take-back of the ‘right’ or 
‘benefit’ under assault.78 
 
executive.  See supra note 25 and sources cited therein on the Gore litigation. 
 75 See infra Part II; see also supra note 40 and sources cited therein on backlash 
activism and legal retrenchment through cultural warfare. 
 76 For examples, see Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra note 17, at 1438-40 
and sources cited therein. 
 77 Just this year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated this act of 
congressional oppression, in pursuit of cultural warfare specifically against sexual 
minorities, under the First Amendment.  See Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004).  For background information on 
this legislation and the efforts of legal educators to ameliorate its effects as well as to 
reverse it, see Francisco Valdes, Solomon’s Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 
THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 352 (1998). 
 78 This prong of the culture wars also works in tandem with the others, as 
illustrated by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in which the Supreme Court 
rubber-stamped the selective defunding of programs that provide abortion-related 
information to thwart in practice, as much as possible, women’s right to informed 
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As this brief sketch indicates, law and policy are central to the 
 
and unfettered reproductive choice.  In this particular case, the first prong of the 
culture wars produced the legislature with the will and animus to target women’s 
rights for systematic and strategic retrenchment, the second produced the courts 
that would undermine reproductive rights jurisprudentially and shield 
discriminatory or abusive legislation from effective challenges, and the third line of 
attack produced the de-funding statute when other jurisprudential and legislative 
efforts to erase abortion altogether continued to falter despite intensifying backlash 
fire.  For similar examples of this dynamic, see Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation, supra 
note 17, at 1439-40, n.126. 
These three prongs or fronts of the culture wars effectively serve to help 
reanimate the historic dominance of colonial-era traditions within the United States, 
interrupting anew a slow and troubled historical progression from formal 
subordination, to formal equality and antidiscrimination, to, perhaps some day, 
antisubordination and social transformation.  See supra note 13 and sources cited 
therein on antidiscrimination and antisubordination.  But this cultural warfare is not 
limited to these three principal lines of reaction and attack: these established lines of 
backlash kulturkampf have been accompanied by additional efforts focused on 
control over the instruments or means of knowledge production and dissemination 
as part of cultural formation and politics.  These reinforcing efforts notably have 
included the creation of a think tank network to concoct justifications for this take-
back campaign for public consumption.  For an excellent expose of this particular 
aspect of backlash kulturkampf, see JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: 
HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA’S SOCIAL 
AGENDA (1996).   
These efforts also have included the systematic “deregulation” of the means of 
mass communication since the 1980s to permit, if not facilitate, their formal 
consolidation in ever-larger combinations of capital, which in turn have helped 
impose centralized corporate control over broadcast journalism as a profession, as 
well as to unravel longstanding public policies in favor “viewpoint diversity” in the 
mass media.  See Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 839 (2002) (surveying the policy changes effectuated during the past two 
decades of cultural warfare, during which policy was redirected from the long-held 
objective of “dispersed ownership” and replaced with the policy of “media 
concentration” currently in place, and evaluating the impact of the media ownership 
rules and patterns as a “huge non-democratice organized force that has major power 
over politics, public discourse and culture”).  This redirection of media policy and 
politics was effectuated through executive appointments the Federal 
Communications Commission, whose actions have been challenged judicially with 
mixed results.  For a recent example involving these media concentration policies in 
the context of a particular mega-merger, see Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 
F.3d 372 (2004) (upholding in part and invalidating in part the FCC’s ownership 
policy decisions).  The end result has been an increasingly concentrated and 
homogenized use of the media to construct mass perceptions and public 
consciousness in ideological and cultural alignment with the politics of fear and 
control that help to motivate backlash in law and society—an unprecedented 
concentration of private power over mass media through a redirection of federal 
public policy to further entrench the cultural hegemony of neocolonial interests, 
“values” and politics at the expense of a heterogeneous and multicultural society.  
This structural disabling of independent media outlets to neturalize a potential or 
actual obstruction to the backlash agenda thus has been part and parcel of today’s 
kulturkampf at least since Nixon’s notorious bashing of the so-called “liberal” media.  
See supra note 41. 
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waging of backlash kulturkampf to bring about a social and formal 
restoration of the old or “traditional” deal that governed North 
American society since colonial times.  As this sketch also illustrates, 
the culture wars’ three prongs are interactive and mutually-
reinforcing.  Though backlashers are not yet able to synchronize or 
control the outcomes of their campaigns perfectly, they methodically 
manipulate the levers of power in carefully orchestrated ways that 
pose the most acute threat to the possibility of social equality in 
North America today.  To advance these aims, today’s backlash 
appointees have employed manifold tools and concepts to redraw 
entire areas of constitutional jurisprudence to their ideological liking. 
II. LAW, IDENTITY AND ANXIETY: BACKLASH ACTIVISM AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
As the mini-case study sketched in the counterpart to this 
Afterword illustrates, liberty-privacy law—and majoritarian regulation 
of gender and sexuality—have been central to the assertion of 
backlash politics in the form of backlash jurisprudence.79  This 
doctrinal centrality makes manifest the salience of supremacist 
anxieties within backlash circles over gender and sexual identities, 
and over their social evolution and articulation during the past 
century and today. The salience of other sociolegal identity categories 
targeted by backlashers (and fueled by similar anxieties of threatened 
supremacies) is similarly underscored by other doctrinal areas 
subjected to substantive and/or procedural and evidentiary 
transmutation under backlash activism during the past two decades 
or so. 
Most notable, perhaps, is the salience of race and ethnicity, and 
of backlash anxieties over the legal and social disturbance of 
“traditional” hierarchies based on them, as illustrated first and 
foremost by the direct interventions into the substance and 
administration of antidiscrimination law under both statutory and 
constitutional federal equality mandates.  The gathering clouds of 
backlash (and the limits of liberal vision) can be seen in early cases 
like Washington v. Davis,80 the 1976 ruling that made plain how 
prevalent conceptions of equality were socially limited to formal, as 
opposed to actual, aspirations. In that case, the Justices decided that 
state actions with a foreseeable or predictable disparate negative 
impact on traditionally subordinated groups would not be deemed 
impermissible discrimination in most constitutional equality cases 
 
 79 See Valdes, Culture by Law, supra note 8. 
 80 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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unless the victim-plaintiff could prove an actual subjective motive or 
“intent” to cause or exacerbate such disparities.  In choosing to opt 
for this doctrinal standard—a choice neither inevitable nor 
calculated to effectuate formal equality in social terms—the Justices 
of course chose to place foreseeably difficult, if not insurmountable, 
evidentiary obstacles to the vindication of violated civil or 
constitutional equality rights: already able to occlude actual intent 
and adept at it, henceforth defendants would also be better able to 
couch their discriminatory practices in ostensibly neutral actions that 
more easily shielded them from legal liability.81  Perhaps unwittingly, 
those judges presaged some of the rhetorics and techniques that 
since have become backlash hallmarks; perhaps the Supreme Court’s 
1989 term best marks the earliest moment of ascendancy for backlash 
jurisprudence in institutional terms. 
Three 1989 rulings—Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 82 City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,83 and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union84—
exemplify backlash jurisprudence, and its social hostility to civil rights 
in race/ethnicity cases, while pretending fidelity to the 
antidiscrimination principle.  The first and third focus on race in 
antidiscrimination employment contexts, both under the 
Constitution and federal legislation, while the second case focuses on 
race and the Fourteenth Amendment in affirmative action 
nonfederal set-aside programs. In each case, the majority claimed 
neutral and righteous adherence to the antidiscrimination principle 
and its remedial mandates.  In each instance, however, the result was 
to roll back equality policies or “affirmative action” programs 
designed primarily to interrupt self-perpetuating racial hierarchies 
instilled over time by rules of law, and thus to implement in socially 
meaningful terms the “opportunity” promised to all by formal 
equality.85  Each ruling in this trio signals and exemplifies backlash 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence, and its hostility to civil rights laws 
socially while paying lip service to them formally.86 
 
 81 For an early and incisive analysis of this doctrinal choice, see Charles Lawrence 
III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. 
REV. 317 (1987). 
 82 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 83 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 84 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 85 For an incisive review of this trio, see Gould, supra note 38. 
 86 In the first, Wards Cove, the judges effectively overturned an inconvenient 
precedent, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which had held that a 
showing of a subjective intent to discriminate was not the only way to prove 
discrimination under the statutory scheme established by Congress; unlike a claim 
made under the Constitution and effectively precluded by Washington v. Davis, Griggs 
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had held that the disparate impact of a facially neutral employment practice also 
could suffice to prove a statutory violation.  Yet in Ward’s Cove the judges opined to 
the contrary: in their opinion, employment practices that actually had segregated 
workers of color in the lowest-paying and lowest-status job categories of the 
workplace were not deemed sufficient to state a claim of discrimination because the 
segregation could, the judges speculated, be a “pool” problem. 
In Croson, the judges decided that remedial efforts of state and local 
governments to ameliorate the present effects of pervasive societal discrimination in 
the past based on race would be subjected to the same level of hostile judicial 
scrutiny as applied historically to invidious forms of discrimination designed to 
subordinate social groups on the basis of race, nationality or ethnicity.  By choosing 
to apply this “fatal” form of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs enacted by 
state or local governments, the Croson judges not only interposed their power over 
democratic decision-making in ways markedly inconsistent with the general 
valorization of majoritarianism in backlash jurisprudence.  For an example of such 
valorization, see Valdes, Culture by Law, supra note 8 (discussing the majority opinion’s 
intonation of deference to democracy in Bowers, decided by a 5-4 vote, and reversed 
last year by another 5-4 vote).  In effect, they circumscribed the discretion of today’s 
majorities to disgorge some of the ill-gotten gains arrogated and bequeathed by their 
predecessors-in-interest.  And to impede local equality efforts in this way, they 
strained for a novel conceptual formulation that superficially justifies their assertion 
of this power: henceforth, democratic policy initiatives designed to disgorge the ill-
gotten gains of white supremacy through majoritarian practices of invidious 
discrimination would be formally equated in backlash jurisprudence with remedial 
policies or programs designed to ameliorate the continuing legacies of those 
practices.  This inversion is not only Orwellian, but it also is foreseeably likely to short 
circuit legislative interest in policy innovations that might translate the formal 
commitment to equality into a socially relevant set of practices and outcomes. 
Even more aggressively or actively, in the last of this 1989 trio the judges decided 
to reconsider a well-established precedent sua sponte, without any request from the 
parties.  Brushing aside another precedent they apparently considered inconvenient, 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the judges in Patterson announced that the 
antidiscrimination protection in private employment contracts mandated by Section 
1981, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, henceforth would be limited strictly to the 
moment of the contract’s “formation”—and not to actions and omissions preceding 
formation or constituting performance.  Consequently, the periods of time that may 
be denominated as contract negotiation and contract performance, and the actions 
taken by employers during that time, became immunized from statutory regulation.  
The predictable and practical social effect of this willful reconsideration and 
rejection of a precedent that had withstood the test of time under the watch of many 
judges was to eviscerate the statute’s ambit and severely limit its capacity to promote 
employment equality in operation. 
Though reversals of precedent are supposed to be rare and circumspect, the 
activism based on speculation that the Wards Cove judges displayed made plain that 
traditional institutional canons would not restrain backlash kulturkampf in the form 
of backlash jurisprudence.  In order to help set the stage for wholesale reversals in 
the form of backlash jurisprudence, then-Justice William Rehnquist asserted in 1990 
that Supreme Court precedents decided by a 5-4 vote and “over spirited dissents” 
merited lesser deference as precedent.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-29 
(1991) (reversing two precedents from 1987 and 1989).  Because most of the 
backlash reversals of precedent are themselves 5-4 rulings reached over spirited 
dissents, this assertion in turn should make it easier to justify in coming years the 
reversal of most backlash rulings rendered during this period of backlash 
kulturkampf. 
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Notwithstanding the contorted justifications proferred in those 
opinions, the ideological valence and political imperatives of the 
choices and actions taken in the 1989 cases were obvious to 
contemporary observers, and remain so today.  As Justice Marshall 
famously said shortly afterward, “the Court’s approach to civil rights 
cases has changed markedly . . . . It is difficult to characterize last 
term’s decisions as a product of anything other than a retrenching of 
the civil rights agenda.”87  Since then, and through the 1990s, the five-
member cadre of backlash justices needed to proclaim backlash 
rulings as the “supreme law of the land” has coalesced with increasing 
frequency to unravel delicate strands of antidiscrimination and 
related fields of law, oftentimes in the name of history and tradition 
and/or democracy and federalism.  Since then, a bare majority of the 
current appointees to the Supreme Court has embarked on an 
ambitious campaign of doctrinal revision that seems organized 
primarily by outcome-oriented concerns that track the neocolonial 
dynamics of the culture wars and endorse the imperatives of reaction 
and retrenchment: whether driven by simple coincidence or 
ideological imperative, the fact remains that in culture war cases, 
sexual minorities, racial/ethnic minorities, religious minorities, 
women, environmentalists and/or the disabled, among other Others, 
invoked the law’s protection but were judicially rebuffed and pushed 
beyond the reached of conveniently redrawn jurisprudential borders.  
This constancy holds true with few exceptions, and usually takes place 
through the juridical manipulation of asserted conflicts between the 
demands of history, tradition, democracy and federalism against the 
needs or wants of civil rights—or, as the matter oftentimes has been 
phrased, a conflict between federal might (on behalf of outgroups) 
and states’ rights (on behalf of ingroups).88 
 
 87 Hon. Thurgood Marshall, Transcription of Remarks, Annual Judicial Conference, 
Second Circuit of the United States, 130 F.R.D. 166, 167 (1990). 
 88 Though not the focus of this summary sketch, it bears note that backlashers 
exploit even purely technical or “procedural” cases as retrenchment opportunities.  
For example, in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the early core of judges 
associated with backlash spearheaded a decision that black school children and their 
parents had no standing to challenge illegal tax exemptions to racially discriminatory 
private academies because they had not personally applied for admission to them, 
even though the pleadings stated injury based on “elementary economics” that 
reduced integrated education.  Likewise, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 505 
(1992) the same basic core of backlash justices rebuffed the claims of 
environmentalists, again interposing standing requirements: the problem here, 
declared those judges, was that the environmentalists had not purchased airline 
tickets to the locales in question.  Hence, their injury was not imminent.  At the same 
time, the same basic set of appointees perceived standing in Northeastern Florida 
Chapter of Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993), for white 
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In the early 1990s, the backlash bloc turned its attention to race 
and its intersection with electoral politics—the first prong of the 
culture wars.   Four important interventions during that decade, 
including Shaw v. Reno in 1993, punctuated their efforts in voting 
rights cases to whittle away methodically at federal civil rights 
legislation designed to help pry open the doors of the political 
system—legislation designed to enable the meaningful participation 
in formally “democratic” lawmaking of racial minorities traditionally 
excluded de jure and de facto from the electoral, and hence 
lawmaking, process.89  The sociolegal background of these 
interventions is clear: after generations of exclusion, coinciding with 
the formative years of the Republic and the accumulation or 
entrenchment of economic position and social status, outgroups were 
in no position suddenly to claim their political rights under formal 
 
construction workers complaining of a minority set-aside program—even though 
none of them had tried to apply for a contract under the challenged program.  
These cases showed that sometimes the judges will accept loss of  “opportunity” to 
satisfy the requisite of “injury” while other times they demand the injury be 
something more, something difficult to satisfy; and which of the two they pick 
appears to depend on whether or not these five justices like or dislike the type of 
claim and claimant before them.  For similar examples and critiques, see supra note 
38 and sources cited therein on the manipulation of litigation results by federal 
judicial appointees.  Indeed, these sorts of in/consistencies have induced dissenting 
justices (as well as other commentators) to observe that backlash jurisprudence on 
procedural, jurisdictional and related fields “is no more than a poor disguise” for 
these judges’ attitudes toward the underlying claims and claimants.  E.g., Allen, 468 
U.S. at 766 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
 89 The other 1990s voting rights cases following from Shaw include Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), wherein lower federal judges twice had struck down 
state legislative redistricting plans that, based on the 1990 Census, included two and 
three black-majority districts.  Instead, the lower courts had ordered a plan with a 
single such district, thus cutting the potential electoral strength of racial minorities 
by half or more.  In another one of these cases, Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), 
the same basic scenario recurred.  When they reached the Supreme Court, the 
backlash bloc of five upheld both judicial reductions in the state legislative plans, 
declaring that those state legislative efforts, generated in part by the Voting Rights 
Act to maximize minority representation, amounted to an impermissible form of 
racism.  And, during that same term, the same five justices indirectly struck down 
federal regulations in Reno v. Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. 471 (1997), that had required 
the Justice Department to consider dilution of minority voting strength when state 
voting procedures are modified, effectively licensing statutorily-prohibited 
“retrogression” in voting rights gains.  In these three cases, as in Shaw, backlash 
jurisprudence interjected newly heightened evidentiary standards to trump 
democratic decision-making in the form of local and state redistricting plans as well 
as in the form of the federal legislation that since 1965 had mandated such efforts.  
See also infra note 91.  After these four rulings over a four-year period by the same 
bloc of five judges, the growing but numerically-outnumbered racial/ethnic 
minorities of the United States are positioned for even greater marginality in the 
electoral politics that produce law—including antidiscrimination law and its 
retrenchment or expansion—via the ongoing culture wars. 
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federal equality against the localized ingroup machines that by and 
large ran their states, if not their local communities and 
neighborhoods.  After decades of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other 
devices used by entrenched elites in the states to deny in practice the 
formal right to vote to racial minorities, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
was enacted to lend federal weight to minority rights to full and 
meaningful access to electoral power, including a mandate of no 
“retrogression” in gains.  The law worked to some extent, creating an 
unprecedented level of minority elected officials; but as with other 
civil rights legislation, meager social effects triggered fierce 
traditionalist reaction.  And precisely because control of elections 
and their results is key to the neocolonial agenda of the culture wars, 
backlash jurisprudence has been quite active—and “activist”—in the 
voting rights law: to retrench unwelcome minority advances in 
lawmaking prowess, backlash jurisprudence incongruously pits Equal 
Protection’s antidiscrimination mandate on behalf of local white 
ingroups, and against the principal congressional remedy tailored to 
multiple generations of anti-minority voting rights discrimination.  
Perversely, this inverted judicial concoction serves to eviscerate or 
circumscribe that majoritarian (or “democratic”) remedy in the very 
name of formal equality. 
This area of backlash activism was marked for transmutation in 
1993’s Shaw v. Reno,90 which set aside a redistricting plan established 
pursuant to established interpretations of constitutional equality law 
and accepted applications of the Voting Rights Act.  This ruling set 
the stage for the subsequent voting rights cases of that decade and 
backlashers’ substantive retooling (and practical diminution) of 
minority voting rights, and thus of electoral influence.  Despite their 
professed deference to majoritarian lawmaking, backlashers displayed 
no compunction in their use of judicial power to trump the law and 
policy choices of the Congress and President as embodied in the 
Voting Rights Act.  Moreover, as in Croson and other backlash rulings, 
today’s appointees were forced to redraw case law dramatically in 
order to narrow the previously well-established remedial uses of race 
and ethnicity, in this instance under the Voting Rights Act.  As in 
Croson and most other backlash rulings, the practical effects of their 
opinions and choices help to frustrate, rather than to effectuate, the 
central purpose of a remedial statute—in this instance, eliminating 
the historic and present suppression of outgroup electoral power 
based specifically on race and ethnicity.  In addition to baring the 
teeth of backlash, Shaw and its kulturkampf progeny illustrate the 
 
 90 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
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interactive and mutually reinforcing interplay of the culture wars’ 
first two prongs, in which the first prong produces the power to 
legislate and to appoint judges, who in turn will exercise their 
institution’s powers to dismantle existing legal structures and shield 
new backlash legislation from any serious or principled review.91 
Having narrowed the federal power to promote democracy in 
substantive terms under this landmark legislation, the backlash 
appointees were poised to tackle federal power to promote 
antidiscrimination as law and policy in more general terms: by 1995, 
when the preceding years of backlash appointments finally jelled into 
a more-or-less solid line-up to control the Court’s powers, the 
backlash bloc began to pronounce a “new” kind of backlash 
federalism that suddenly presented just-as-new problems for federal 
antidiscrimination lawmaking and enforcement in varied doctrinal or 
social categories.  Since then, these efforts have focused, but certainly 
have not been limited to, four constitutional provisions that interact 
sharply in backlash opinions.  The first, Congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause of Article I, is the only one of the four found 
in the body of the original document.  The other three are found in 
the amendments to the original: the Tenth Amendment, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which contains its enforcement provisions.  The Commerce Clause 
and Section 5 have proven over history to be the main sources of 
federal legislative authority over civil rights law and policy—over 
federal authority to legislate the antidiscrimination principle into law, 
and to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in relatively proactive ways that help to break up local 
neocolonial oligarchies, and their grip on access to wealth, power and 
opportunity.  Thus, as with the Voting Rights Act, the sociolegal 
background of these interventions is clear; using the Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendments, by the mid-1990s these five judges were 
prepared to begin in earnest to put an end to that. 
Two 1995 cases, Adarand v. Pena92 and United States v. Lopez,93 
mark the doctrinal ascendancy of this backlash effort to tightly 
 
 91 Thus, despite their custom of intoning the need for judicial deference to 
majoritarian democracy, in these rulings the backlash bloc deployed the federal 
judicial power under their current control to trump longstanding democratic policy 
choices, embodied in the Voting Rights Act, to further stack the political deck 
against racial-ethnic minorities in the periodic contests of formal or nominal 
democracy—exercises of power that, as described above, constitute the first and 
primary “front” or prong of the culture wars.  See supra notes 58-75. 
 92 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 93 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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circumscribe federal legislative power under Section 5 and the 
Commerce Clause, respectively.  In Adarand, the judges overturned a 
key precedent—Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC94—to subject Congress’ 
use of remedial Section 5 powers to “strict” judicial scrutiny, thus 
giving the backlash bloc heightened power to invalidate civil rights 
legislation while simultaneously inhibiting legislative capacity to use 
antidiscrimination law to root out socially entrenched realities 
instilled and valorized de jure.  In Lopez, they declared that Congress 
had no power to regulate guns around public schools under the 
Commerce Clause because gun control is not related to commerce; 
under the Tenth Amendment gun regulation falls beyond federal 
reach.  While Lopez thus was not an antidiscrimination suit, the 
reduction of federal legislative power under the Commerce Clause 
came freighted with historical and potential significance for 
antidiscrimination law and policy,95 as was borne out during the next 
several terms.96 
The very next year, 1996, the backlash bloc was busy emplacing 
the related doctrinal conditions necessary for this sweeping reduction 
in the remedial antidiscrimination powers of the federal government, 
as exemplified by their pronouncements in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
 
 94 497 U.S. 547 (1995). 
 95 The social reduction or elimination of discrimination in and through federal 
regulation of the economy had become an especially salient element in the 
elaboration of the antidiscrimination principle because of prior decisions of the 
Court, which in earlier times had restricted the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Denied in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the power by a prior 
set of judges to legislate antidiscrimination law directly under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congresses of the Twentieth Century turned to other Article I powers 
under the Constitution.  As a result, the Civil Rights Act of 1964—an 
antidiscrimination linchpin—and other landmark civil rights laws were enacted, and 
upheld, as exercises of the Commerce Clause power.  When backlash judges chip 
away at this particular power, they do so with full knowledge of that power’s central 
role in the historic development—and maintenance—of antidiscrimination law as 
national policy in the United States.  Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
explicitly directed at state action, and thus Section 5 powers are similarly restricted—
or so held these same judges in a recent case involving both the Commerce Clause 
and Section 5.  See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.  The historical and 
substantive bottom line is clear: the Commerce Clause is and has been the primary 
basis for federal capacity to reach “private” discrimination, while Section 5 is and has 
been the main federal means to compel state compliance with federal standards 
equality.  Both are essential pillars of federal antidiscrimination lawmaking and law 
enforcement.  Using federalism generally, and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments 
specifically, backlash jurisprudence therefore targets both for retrenchment.  See 
also infra notes 98-103 and cases cited therein. 
 96 See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text on the 2000 term federalism 
cases. 
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Florida,97 a case key to this set-up.  In Seminole Tribe, this bloc of five 
judges again single-handedly decided that Congress had no power 
under the portion of the Commerce Clause relating to “Indian tribes” 
to subject states to suits in federal court for violations of federal 
rights. More generally, in Seminole Tribe these five judges—again 
single-handedly overturning precedent—declared that the Eleventh 
Amendment trumped Article I, and that Congress therefore could 
not authorize suits against states under the Commerce Clause for 
violations of federal rights.  Within a few short years, the backlash 
appointees had managed to begin sidelining the principal sources of 
federal antidiscrimination lawmaking employed during the past 
century to enact most of today’s civil rights federal statutes—thus 
bringing them all into constitutional question. 
Exacerbating these mid-1990s interventions, the same five judges 
then followed up on their Seminole Tribe ruling three terms later, in 
three backlash rulings of the 1999 term that emphasized their 
determination to render Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment the 
exclusive source of federal legislative power to abrogate state 
immunity in the enforcement of federal civil rights laws.98  But the 
backlash bloc furthermore used these federalism cases to constrict 
even this power, in effect emphasizing their intent to employ the 
federal judicial review power not only to incapacitate federal 
legislative power over civil rights pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 
but also to monitor actively Congressional enactments under Section 
5 designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality 
mandate on behalf of social or economic outgroups.  These and 
similar backlash rulings, imputed to federalism, have asserted “for the 
first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no 
authority to subject a State to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the 
behest of an individual asserting a federal right”—an astonishing 
assertion entailing wholesale reversals of precedent that, therefore, 
have prompted spirited protests from that same Bench.99  In other 
words, the five backlash judges effectively (and again single-
handedly) declared in these remarkable opinions that Congress of 
course may pass its antidiscrimination and civil rights laws, but it 
 
 97 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 98 In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the same bloc further declared that 
federal rights cannot be asserted in state courts either—unless the states agree to let 
themselves be sued.  In two more cases of the 1999 term involving the same parties, 
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), these same five justices—
again overturning precedent—extended “states rights” yet again, declaring that states 
were immune to patent and unfair advertising suits under federal statutory schemes. 
 99 E.g., 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter J., dissenting). 
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cannot authorize suits by private citizens to enforce those concededly 
constitutional laws, nor to remedy their actual violation.  Formal, but 
not social, equality is likely to survive this sort of backlash activism.  
Pushing ahead with their forced contraction and redirection of 
well-established law and policy, the same five backlash appointees of 
the current Court banded together again in the first term of the new 
millennium to pronounce, in United States v. Morrison,100 that Congress 
could not, under the Commerce Clause, enact the civil remedy 
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, because violence 
against women—like gun control in Lopez—was deemed, in their 
view, unrelated to “commerce.”  Moreover, Section 5 powers also 
failed here, the judges declared in Morrisson, because, in their view, 
the problem of “violence against women” simply did not merit the 
sort of statute or remedy that Congress enacted.101  Morrison thus 
illustrates aptly the vise into which the backlash judges have put 
federal civil rights power: the cumulative doctrinal valence of the 
backlashers’ opinions in Morrison and other culture war cases is 
designed to eviscerate the potential for either the Commerce Clause 
or Section 5 to serve as sturdy bases of federal civil rights legislation 
in the new millennium.  With these strings of cases, the five backlash 
judges responsible for these willful rulings single-handedly here 
created the means for backlashers in all branches and levels of 
government to side-step the two main tools used historically by 
Congress to enact into law federal antidiscrimination policy, thus 
helping to turn back the hands of time to the 1930s, when a similarly 
activist group of judges on the Supreme Court used that tribunal to 
block federal power to legislate social or formal reform.102  With these 
and similar rulings of the new millennium, the backlash bloc deploys 
 
 100 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 101 And in another backlash ruling of the 2000 term, U.S. v. Morrison, supra note 
100l, the same five judges furthermore concluded that Section 5—the second main 
Congressional tool to promote equality—was no answer either, because the statute 
sought to reach violence against women generally, including private rather than state 
action. By limiting progressively the potency of Section 5 through selectively strict 
construction, the backlash quintet solidifies the social and legal entrenchment of 
neocolonial inter-group hierarchies and supremacies, as well as magnifies their 
ideological agenda.  See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.  
 102 By cutting down the power of Congress to regulate commerce in general, these 
five justices foreseeably, if not calculatedly, make it more likely that entrenched 
“private” biases and prejudices fanned by Law in preceding generations will continue 
to pervade both social and economic transactions, and to preserve through the net 
effects of those transactions the historic skews established formally, socially and 
economically under de jure regimes of subordination.  Thus, the social stratification 
of society constructed through de jure subordination becomes the entrenched de 
facto status quo in social and economic relations. 
  
2005 KULTURKAMPF TO RESURRECT THE OLD DEAL 1453 
the federal judicial power to prohibit the use of the Law to undo what 
the Law previously was marshaled to do; backlash appointees use the 
federal judicial power to deny to the remedy the tools necessary to 
match and fit the harm, thus leaving in place the de facto status quo 
previously established and consolidated de jure.103 
The summary capsules sketched above of course present an 
abbreviated and incomplete rendition of neocolonial kulturkampf 
through backlash jurisprudence.  But, as this critical sketch indicates, 
backlash retrenchment sweeps across multiple swaths of 
constitutional law, and adversely affects many if not all outgroups, 
whether based on race or ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation, and 
disability or age.  And as in Patterson, Croson, Adarand, Lopez, Morrison, 
and so many of the culture war cases sketched above, backlash 
jurisprudes assert without compunction their control of the federal 
 
 103 The new millennium also saw the same judges’ continued and intensified 
employment of the Eleventh Amendment to shield states from federal or citizen 
efforts to force compliance with federal rights, and these cases sometimes have 
required backlashers to retrench well-established precedents on Congress’ Section 5 
powers as well.  For example, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), 
Congress had exercised its Section 5 powers to ban employment discrimination 
based on disability and to require accommodations that would open access for the 
disabled to the nation’s social and economic mainstreams.  But the backlash bloc 
decided that Congress simply had failed to develop a legislative record in the 
exercise of its democratic will to support sufficiently, in the view of these five justices, 
the legislative conclusion that disabled workers required federal legislative 
antidiscrimination action to ensure their equal protection in employment under the 
law.  For good measure, the judges went further in this case, holding that Section 5’s 
reach would henceforth be halted at the state level, and therefore will be not be able 
to reach local governments, such as cities and counties, where most of the workplace 
discrimination at issue in Garrett took place anyway.  In this way, the backlash bloc 
engineered a remarkable contraction of democratic decision-making at the federal 
level, interposing their own power as a bloc in current control of the Supreme Court 
to restrict the potential for pro-equality democratic lawmaking, and doing so yet 
again at the direct expense of a long-marginalized social group: disabled workers.   
In another 2000 case, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the 
same bloc of five judges joined to issue Part IV of the opinion, attributed to the 
Court, in which they declared that Congress also lacks power under Article I to 
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity, even when a state law or practice allegedly 
violates a federal law or right that is within the constitutional purview of Congress.  
Additionally, the same five judges used that same portion of the opinion to block 
suits by a state’s own citizens—an expansion of the Eleventh Amendment beyond its 
plain text, which expressly refers only to immunity from suits against states by citizens 
of “other” states.  U.S. CONST. amend XI.  This blatantly selective textual expansion 
seems, again, most likely to help suppress the use of legal process to vindicate 
substantive antidiscrimination claims based on federal law.  Moreover, in Kimel, as in 
Garrett, the backlash judges went further: Section 5 was no answer here either, they 
opined, this time asserting that the statute was not “appropriate legislation” because 
its remedies were more potent than the judges thought necessary, or appropriate.  
Kimel, 528 U.S. 62, 82-93. 
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judicial power to undo established precedent and democratic or 
majoritarian lawmaking, whether in the form of state or federal 
legislation, when those sources of law stand in the way of 
accomplishing the backlash agenda of the national culture wars—and 
regardless of their contrary proclamations at other times formally 
adoring judicial restraint, deference to democracy and the like.104  
The backlash record in jurisprudence-making thus emerges as tightly 
consistent with the neocolonial agenda of backlash kulturkampf: 
when state power is used on behalf of outgroups or to uphold the 
“liberal” legacy of the Twentieth Century, the use is invalidated or 
narrowed, either directly through substantive pronouncements or 
indirectly through evidentiary, procedural and similar roadblocks; 
when state power is used on behalf of ingroups to retrench the 
“liberal” legacy, it is accommodated, congratulated, validated.  The 
“losers” are: federal powers over the enforcement of all civil rights; 
women’s equality and reproductive choice; immigrants’ ability to 
build a dignified and secure life; gun control legislation to protect 
schools and schoolchildren; the environment; black children in 
elementary and secondary public schools and their parents; the 
disabled; older workers; the criminally accused; the voting strength of 
African Americans, Latinas/os, Asian Americans and other 
racial/ethnic minorities; sexual minorities and their ability to 
cultivate without persecution their intimate relationships; families, 
careers and other basic elements of life; and the disabled and their 
opportunity to function socially and with dignity.  As a set and 
individually, the contorted opinions in these and similar culture war 
cases since the mid-to-late 1980s to the dawn of the new millennium 
have thrown new roadblocks in the way of this nation’s unfinished 
and acrimonious progression toward social equality and social equity 
under the rule of law.   And with the dawn of the new millennium, 
the patterns and imperatives of backlash kulturkampf through 
backlash jurisprudence not only remain unabated, but appear poised 
 
 104 In all of these cases, however, the backlash judges continue paying lip service 
to the principles underlying the precedent and legislation that they subvert.  At no 
time does backlash jurisprudence confess its disdain for the national commitment to 
the antidiscrimination principle.  Instead, as briefly sketched above, various 
techniques appear to mask the purpose and effects of their opinions: conflicts with 
competing values are conjured, and used to curtail civil rights; rules of evidence and 
procedure are invoked, and then deployed to shield discrimination from viable 
claims; precedent is critiqued and rejected—or manipulated through “creative” 
distinction; pro-equality legislation is cabined.  See supra notes 80-103 and 
accompanying text.  The details and crannies of these culture war cases are myriad, 
but the overarching pattern of their doctrinal and social results is not.  See supra 
notes 26-59 and accompanying text. 
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to continue with increasing stridency its systematic unraveling of the 
policies and precedents of established in previous generations, or by 
other institutions of law. 
However, as this symposium and other LatCrit publications help 
to illustrate,105 critical legal scholars in the United States (and beyond 
it) continue seeking ways to preserve the limited and fragile gains 
secured under the antidiscrimination principle while simultaneously 
articulating the principles and techniques of an antisubordination 
framework.106  Thus, if measured in national and immediate terms, 
this sociolegal moment seemingly belongs to backlashers and their 
neocolonial agenda of bringing back the old deal. Yet the OutCrit 
labors that continue to elaborate evolutionary understandings of 
“equal justice for all” simultaneously help to ensure that law and 
policy remain viable means of resuming the nation’s fitful historic 
march toward the ultimate goals of justice and equality in the not-too-
distant the future.  This moment, in sum, represents a juncture from 
which both backlashers and OutCrits issue urgent calls to the nation. 
 
 
III. ESTABLISHING THE WAYS AND MEANS OF PRESENT AND FUTURE 
RESISTANCE: SOCIAL JUSTICE PEDAGOGIES AND  
CRITICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
Control of knowledge, and of knowledge construction, at 
bottom is as central to the success of backlash kulturkampf as is 
control over the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the 
federal government.  And as critical education theorists have shown, 
all forms of education over time become institutions that tend to 
operate either as instruments of colonization and self-colonization, or 
of the contrary—emancipation and self-emancipation.107 Under this 
view, formal education oftentimes operates to justify the world 
constructed by the cultural, economic and political elites that 
 
 105 See, supra note 3 for previous LatCrit symposia and visit the LatCrit website, 
http://www.latcrit.org, for a more up-to-date listing of publications. 
 106  See Valdes, Antidiscrimination, supra note 9 at 273 (contrasting the liberal, 
critical and backlash jurisprudential approaches to the antisubordination principle); 
see also Jerome M Culp, Jr., et al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435 (2003) 
(discussing antidiscrimination and antisubordination). 
 107 For the classic articulation, PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (rev. ed. 
2000).  For one law student’s insightful view of his educational experience in social 
and structural terms, see David Aaron DeSoto, Ending the Conquest Won Through 
Institutionalized Racism in Our Schools: Multicultural Curricula and the Right to an Equal 
Education, 1 HISP. L.J. 77 (1998). 
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dominate society and control its institutions of education.108  In the 
usual course of things, then, mainstream formal education tends to 
serve the interests of the status quo; in its usual form, education 
formalizes and systematizes the inculcation of cultural politics to 
ratify the world as is.  In short, “education” in practice oftentimes is 
tantamount to domestication in fact. 
In the context of the lands now known as the United States, this 
practice effectively means that education—legal and otherwise—
operates to justify the world constructed by Eurocentric elites during 
the heyday of militarist colonialism and imperialism, and 
furthermore celebrates the reinforcement of those legacies through a 
new heyday of corporate globalization based on colonial bequests.  As 
inherited by each generation of humans, legal education specifically 
serves to justify and perpetuate the social legacies of colonial 
conquest as constructed by, or embedded in, various forms of law and 
policy.109  This service of course is performed both by what is left out 
as well as by what is put into the content or substance of 
contemporary legal education; by leaving out, for instance, 
knowledge of the systematic imposition on this nation and others of 
supremacist identity politics through law an policy to motivate 
conquest and rationalize subordination— a systematic imposition of 
power that forms a key part of the legal story that explains so much of 
the injustice manifest in contemporary students’ social inheritance, 
 
 108 See, e.g., ANTONIA DARDER, CULTURE AND POWER IN THE CLASSROOM: A CRITICAL 
FOUNDATION FOR A BICULTURAL EDUCATION xvii (1991) (citations omitted); see also 
ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(2002) (documenting the restoration of institutionalized preferences for whiteness 
in elite law schools, and the ensuing process of resegregation at one prominent 
institution). 
 109 The footprints of colonial conquest throughout the Americas of course are 
well documented.  See generally CHARLES GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA (1966); RAMON 
GUTIERREZ, WHEN JESUS CAME, THE CORN MOTHERS WENT AWAY: MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY 
AND POWER IN NEW MEXICO, 1500-1846 (1991); LYLE  H. MCALISTER, SPAIN AND 
PORTUGAL IN THE NEW WORLD, 1492-1700 (1984); NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A 
CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY TO PRESENT, 1492-1992 (Peter 
Nabokov ed., 1991); DAVID J. WEBER, THE SPANISH FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA 
(1992).  American adventurism and interventionism throughout the Americas under 
policy imperatives such as the Monroe Doctrine and the Cold War continues this 
history.  See, e,g., RODOLFO ACUÑA, OCCUPIED AMERICA (3d ed., 1988) (assessing 
Chicana/oc communities as internal colonies); Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Latinos in the 
United States: Invitation and Exile, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE 190 (Jean F. Perea ed., 1997); WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE 
REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1993); Ediberto 
Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States’ Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 
1119 (1997).  For a discussion of colonialism’s combined effects from one LatCritical 
perspective, see Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity and Hispanismo in a Triangular 
Perspective: The “Essential Latina/o” and LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305 (2000). 
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and which every new generation struggles to understand; indeed, this 
sociolegal inheritance is the status quo that remains under contest in 
the current culture wars. 
A. The Backlash Agenda and Ignorance as Education: Reinforcing 
Unjust Power 
One example of deceptively-sanitized knowledge offered via 
contemporary (and uncritical) legal education is found in the 
omission of the so called “insular cases” from the case books and 
courses employed to teach constitutional law to new classes of 
entering students nationwide every year.110 The Insular Cases, a series 
of controversies decided as the 19th Century turned into the 20th, 
lent a judicial patina to North American imperialism during the years 
of manifest destiny to justify the conquest and subjugation of people 
in territories that are not states of the United States on the basis of 
specifically Euro-heteropatriarchal identity politics. People, such as 
those in Puerto Rico, were deemed unfit on racial, ethnic and 
cultural grounds to become part of the American nation state.111 This 
 
 110 Among the Insular Cases, perhaps the most significant one is Downes v. Bidwell, 
182 U.S. 244 (1901), in which the Supreme Court ratified the North American 
administration of Puerto Rico as a territory.  See generally JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985).  
These cases capture a brutal side of constitutional law and nation-building, and for 
this reason are not to be found anywhere that a typical contemporary law student 
might venture.  The end result is a skewed understanding of legal history and 
constitutional law.  See generally, Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded 
to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 
241 (2000). 
This particular curricular gap or skew of course is congruent with the structural 
bents of mainstream legal education in the United States, which from the time of its 
formalization was shaped in explicit ways by the social, cultural and political 
dominance of white, Anglo-American nativist-racism as well as societal sexism.  See, 
e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 1449, 1475-92 (1997) (recounting how the American Bar Association, the bar 
examination, the Law School Aptitude Test and other “gatekeeping” mechanisms 
were originated and calculated to be racist, anti-immigrant, sexist and anti-Semitic); 
William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, 
and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167 (2000) (discussing how the 
LSAT continues to project that history into the present); see also ROBERT STEVENS, 
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983) 
(providing a comprehensive account of the politics—including the identity politics—
that dominated the institutionalization of formal legal education); see generally 
NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY 
(1999) (providing a similar history focused, more generally, on the standardized tests 
used in various educational settings in the United States). 
 111 See RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM (1972) (providing a 
comprehensive account of U.S. imperialism and white supremacy, and illustrating 
how the areas targeted by those imperialist ventures now are the sources of today’s 
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act of institutionalized omission and others like it enables the 
sanitized history of the status quo spoon fed to students, day in and 
day out across the country and globe, to keep each succeeding 
generation socially tranquilized, economically exploited, culturally 
subjugated and politically subordinated. In its dominant uncritical 
form, mainstream education teaches every generation to genuflect to, 
and then how to help maintain rather than challenge, the cultural, 
economic and social skews inflicted on these lands since 1492. 
Awareness and wariness of this power and knowledge is precisely 
why critical theory is absent or marginal, still, in formal law school 
curricula from coast to coast, effectively withholding thereby for most 
law students any structured opportunity to acquire self-liberating 
knowledge in the general course of a typical legal education.112 Thus, 
historically as well as presently, the principal aim and effect of 
uncritical mainstream legal education is to prevent the possibility of 
self-decolonization and, instead, to help promote the assimilation 
and domestication of each new generation in the putative name of 
progress and prosperity.  In contrast, by critical legal education I 
therefore mean a formal educational experience that aims to provide 
students with the knowledge and skills to promote social 
emancipation as well as self-emancipation.  At the most basic and 
provisional level, critical education signifies the active application of 
critical theory, and in particular of outsider jurisprudence, to the 
fields of formal knowledge that we teach in law school classrooms or 
elsewhere. Critical legal education is the pedagogy that teaches law 
through the lens of LatCrit and OutCrit theorizing—a critical social 
justice pedagogy representing a fusion of conventional doctrine and 
LatCrit knowledge together with critical education theory.113  Like 
critical pedagogy, critical legal education is aimed at ending the 
remains of colonial conquest.114 
 
immigrant communities, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hispaniola, the Philippines 
and other areas in and beyond the Americas); see generally SCOTT NEARING & JOSEPH 
FREEMAN, DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: A STUDY IN AMERICAN IMPERIALISM (1925) (providing a 
contemporary critical analysis of U.S. expansionism and its socioeconomic 
imperatives). 
 112 E.g., Francisco Valdes, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Education: Making Do 
While Making Waves, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 137 (2001). 
 113 See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice 
Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65 
(2003)[hereinafter Critical Legal Education]. 
 114 See id. at 72-74. This mission statement thus claims for critical legal education a 
grounding and vision similar to the kinds of “critical pedagogy” posited more 
generally among critical education theorists for educational ventures devoted, as are 
these and similar efforts, to social justice for the traditionally-subordinated of the 
world. Critical pedagogy refers to an educational approach rooted in the tradition of 
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As these notes indicate, the key initial ingredients for 
establishment of critical legal education therefore are critical 
educators and critical scholarship: the former, incorporating and 
using the latter in the classroom, is the first necessary step toward 
creating the means and conditions for the delivery of a critical 
education to today’s law students.  Thus, the (limited) diversification 
of the North American legal professorate racially and otherwise 
during the past two or so decades, and the emergence of critical 
outsider jurisprudence that these “outsiders” in legal academia have 
helped generate during that time, have put into place the two key 
initial conditions for interested law students to learn the skills, 
knowledge and modes of inquiry that will allow them to develop the 
critical capacities to reflect, critique and act to transform the broader 
societal conditions under which they, and we, live. 
B. Toward a Critical Legal Education: A Survey of Current Efforts 
Work toward a critical education in North America in recent 
years has spanned several categories of effort.115 The first might be 
 
critical theory.  Critical educators perceive their primary function as emancipatory 
and their primary purpose as commitment to creating the conditions for students to 
learn the skills, knowledge and modes of inquiry that will allow them to inquire 
critically about the role that society has played in their self formation. More 
specifically, critical pedagogy is designed to give students the tools to examine how 
society has functioned to shape and constrain their aspirations and goals and to 
prevent them from even dreaming about a life outside the one they presently know.  
Critical legal education and pedagogy, at their best, provide lifelines of power based 
on knowledge and principle to marginalized students struggling to become aware of 
the ways and means through which felt and known oppressions are normalized, 
materialized, even valorized. 
 115 This work suggests various—at least seven—features that help to define such 
an education, if it is to achieve its bedrock emancipatory aims.  The first of these 
features is the centrality of specific history, so that we may understand the present 
and its origins—its social construction across the generations. The second is the 
importance of interdisciplinarity in all categories of study and approaches to 
knowledge, and in legal education specifically, to help contextualize the law and its 
social operations. The third feature is the necessity of dialectical method—that is, a 
give-and-take designed to ensure interactivity, through which knowledge and skill are 
transmitted and internalized more effectively and organically. Fourth is the 
indispensability of multidimensional critical analysis to avoid the blind spots of 
essentialisms and the pitfalls of stereotypes.  The fifth feature is recognition of the 
key and symbiotic relationship twines theory to action, a process through which 
social activism is sharpened by critical awareness and vice versa, an ongoing process 
to help ensure solidly grounded theory and practice.  Sixth is heightened awareness 
and understanding of the processes and consequences of dominant forms of 
globalization to help put a spotlight, a critical spotlight, on the latest iteration of 
colonial identity politics.  And the seventh feature of a critical legal education is a 
methodical mapping both of contextual particularities and the interlocking patterns 
that particularities form across multiple borders, so that we ensure both a 
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described as individual intervention. That is, courses which faculty 
members all over the country create and introduce to the curriculum 
and sustain as part of the curriculum through their personal 
commitment to the teaching of that course year after year. The 
second might be described as institutional reforms. A prime 
contemporary example of this kind of institutional reform is the 
“critical race concentration” at the UCLA School of Law, which 
provides a structured two-year curriculum for students interested in 
the study of race and law in multi-dimensional and critical terms.116  
The third example might be described as collective insurrections, by 
which I mean the collective efforts of scholars and activists from 
different institutions, identities, disciplines, world regions and time 
zones who strive to transcend the limitations and the borders of time, 
space and culture to design and mount collective interventions in the 
business-as-usual routines that mainstream, conventional, or 
traditionalist legal education spoon feeds to us on a daily basis.  In 
this last category are two examples mounted by LatCrit and OutCrit 
scholars from various disciplines, institutions and countries to 
establish accessible opportunities for students across and beyond the 
United States: the Critical Global Classroom (CGC), a study-abroad 
program in law, policy and social justice activism117 and the LatCrit 
 
comparative and a critical understanding of social realities, and of how they are co-
constructed through law and its institutions.  These seven features, perhaps coupled 
with others I may have overlooked here, provide a sturdy foundation for the 
implementation of critical legal education at multiple levels of intervention—
whether in individuated, programmatic or combinations of forms.  See generally 
Valdes, Critical Legal Education, supra note 113.  
 116 Students graduate with a certification that is noted in their diplomas.  For a 
recent review of both kinds of these efforts, see Francisco Valdes, Barely at the 
Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal Education-A Curricular Study with LatCritical 
Commentary, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 119 (2002). 
 117 The CGC focuses on human rights and comparative law from a critical 
perspective and is aimed to include the substantial study of critical theory in 
international contexts and comparative terms. In addition students attend the 
LatCrit Colloquium on International and Comparative Law, where they interact 
directly and substantively with diverse scholars from different disciplines and regions 
of the world.  And after the program concludes, the companion Cyber Classroom 
Project encourages and enables CGC graduates (and other like-minded students, 
activists and faculty) to stay in touch and collaborate on matters of mutual interest 
via electronic and other means.   The CGC and Cyber Classroom Project jointly 
create opportunities to forge relationships and build networks of like-minded 
individuals in a formal educational setting, which ideally will continue beyond the six 
weeks of the CGC program, to carry out social justice projects of various sorts in local 
communities, as well as in global venues.  In content, design and aim, these projects, 
like others in the LatCrit Portfolio of Projects, represents a collective effort at 
institutionalizing critical approaches to legal education: both teach and are social 
justice practice at the personal and programmatic level.  For more information on 
the CGC and other LatCrit projects, please visit the LatCrit website at 
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Student Scholar Program (SSP), which provides scholarships and 
mentoring opportunities for students in law and other disciplines 
anywhere in the world to conduct and publish research on race and 
ethnicity.118  These three kinds of reformatory efforts—whether in the 
form of individual interventions, institutional reforms or collective 
insurrections—strive to establish criticality in legal education to help 
create substantive areas of knowledge and effective conceptual 
platforms from which students may “make waves” as agents of social 
and legal transformation.119  Combined with the production and 
application of OutCrit scholarship, these three types of interventions 
into the variegated ways and means of formal legal education help to 
set the stage for a longer-term capacity to promote progress toward a 
postsubordiantion society—and, more to the point, these types of 
interventions likewise help to preserve our collective capacity to 




 118 This program invites students from any discipline in good standing at any 
accredited institution any place in the world to submit an original, unpublished 
manuscript related to questions of race, ethnicity and law. These parameters are 
deliberately flexible to accommodate innovative cross-disciplinary work devoted to 
race, ethnicity and social justice: students who enroll in seminars or similar classes, 
where they already are devoting time to the development of substantive papers, are 
well positioned to participate in this program every year.  As another ongoing 
collective experiment in critical legal education, the Student Scholar Program aims 
to help students produce the knowledge that helps to explain the present—explain it 
in historical, contextual and multidimensional terms.  For more information on the 
SSP and other LatCrit projects, please visit the LatCrit website at 
http://www.latcrit.org. 
 119 These two new experiments in collective social justice programs not only strive 
to institutionalize critical legal education, but they also are designed to work hand in 
hand: both the CGC and the SSP are designed to operate as lifelines to students at 
law school campuses nationwide and beyond. Both respond to student accounts, 
which we oftentimes hear, of intellectual and human isolation experienced by 
critically-minded students in their so-called home institutions. Both offer 
programmatic opportunities to study areas of law and approaches to policymaking 
that otherwise might not be available to today’s socially conscious students in 
structured, formal settings. Moreover, both the CGC and the SSP are intended to 
help cultivate critically-minded students who might be interested in pursuing a 
teaching career in law or other disciplines. Both the CGC and the SSP are designed 
to work synergistically as lifelines to students, as well as pipelines for them into the 
legal⎯or other kinds of⎯academies. Both are examples of collective insurrections in 
the name of critical legal education. Along with the never-ending work of individual 
faculty from coast to coast, these collective experiments seek to establish the makings 
of critical legal education within the confines of traditional legal institutions.  See 
Valdes, Critical Legal Education, supra note 113, at 89-96. 
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CONCLUSION 
Time and again, the “culture war cases” of the past two decades 
or so—whether deemed doctrinally in the realm of liberty-privacy, 
equality and antidiscrimination, voting rights and democracy or other 
areas of law and policy vital to the well-being of traditionally 
subordinated groups in the United States—occasion backlash rulings 
made possible by the court-packing prong of the culture wars.  As 
such, backlash jurisprudence represents the juridical portion of this 
larger societal reaction to the meager social and political gains 
secured to “outsiders” by the formal legal advances of the New Deal-
Civil Rights eras.  Thus, with few exceptions, today’s backlashing 
judges continue to use every constitutional opportunity to actively 
and methodically redraw established or evolving lines of law and 
policy in favor of neocolonial elites, and to retrench New Deal and 
Civil Rights legislation, constitutional precedent and other sources of 
formal equality. To accomplish this basic aim, and as the illustrative 
sketch of cases presented above shows, backlashers resort to 
substantive, evidentiary and procedural devices to buttress 
neocolonial hierarchies of privilege and to rebuff minority claims to 
justice and access.  This substantive effect, is not one big coincidence 
but rather one giant calculation—as the very declaration of formal 
backlash made clear from the outset; these judicial practices, in short, 
reflect and reinforce the larger dynamics of backlash kulturkampf 
that, in turn, help/ed to compose today’s bench for this very 
purpose. 
These doctrinal revisions—and the social legacies they aim to 
entrench further in the legal and social norms of the nation—is what 
LatCrits and other OutCrits must confront and combat; it is this 
repudiation of the Civil Rights and New Deal legacies that LatCrits 
and allied scholars must work now to repudiate in turn.  In this 
context, and at this urgent historical juncture, this year’s conference 
theme and symposium provide a welcome and needed contribution 
to the antisubordination scholarship that remains the bedrock of 
critical outsider jurisprudence, including LatCrit theory and praxis.  
But in addition to the ongoing production of this critical counter-
knowledge, LatCrits and allied OutCrits must take the work on 
critical legal education sketched above to the next level: scholarship, 
while important as an enduring record and tool, is alone insufficient.  
We must also work individually, collaboratively and creatively to 
import critical knowledge, including our growing body of 
scholarship, into today’s education of tomorrow’s leaders.  As this 
year’s conference and symposium underscore, our work as activist 
  
2005 KULTURKAMPF TO RESURRECT THE OLD DEAL 1463 
scholars must continue to focus both on the production of critical 
knowledge as well as on the incorporation of social justice pedagogies 
into contemporary systems of formal education. 
